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I. INTRODUCTION
The American Law Institute's ("ALI") involvement with the
subject of products liability is developing as one of the most interest-
ing sagas in the modern private law. This Article explores the ALI's
efforts to rationalize the subject. Reviewing the ALI's contributions to
the evolution of the law in this area, the Article also asks how the
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Institute should treat the subject in the future, an inquiry that leads
us to the broader question of the role of Restatements of the Law in
the twenty-first century. In press as Congress considers proposals for
sweeping federalization of products liability law, the Article raises the
question of how far a private organization should enmesh itself in a
heavy politicized branch of law.
II. THE PURPOSE OF A RESTATEMENT
The idea of "restating" the law derives from several sources, all
resting on the premise that one can, in fact, improve the law.1
Cardozo set up an ideal, in his characteristic rolling cadences, in a
1921 article proposing a "ministry of justice.2 The ALI first under-
took Restatements in 1923, attacking simultaneously the subjects of
contracts, torts, and conflict of laws.3 After the completion of the first
round of Restatements, William Draper Lewis, director of the
Institute, summarized the premise of those projects as "the belief that
out of the mass of case authority and legal literature could be made
clear statements of the rules of the common law today operative in the
great majority of our States, expressed as simply as the character of
our complex civilization admits."4
The original Torts Restatement, for which Professor Francis
Bohlen primarily served as reporter,5 yielded four volumes with 951
sections, published from 1934 to 1939.6 The effort did not go uncriti-
cized: with his customary vigor, Leon Green suggested that the sub-
ject of torts did not lend itself well to the idea of a Restatement.7 As
to the very idea of "restating torts," Green said that the reporter and
his associates had produced "a sort of dehydrated something, drained
of nearly all the vitality found in such abundance in this, one of the
most dynamic fields of government."s As to the Restatement's classi-
1. For summaries of the history of these ideas, see, for example, Gerald L. Fetner,
Ordered Liberty: Legal Reform In The Twentieth Century 51-54 (U. of Chicago, 1983); John W.
Johnson, American Legal Culture, 1908-1940 52-72 (Greenwood, 1981).
2. Benjamin M. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 113, 114 (1921).
3. See William Draper Lewis, History of the American Law Institute and the First
Restatement of the Law, in ALI, Restatement in the Courts 9 (ALI, permanent ed. 1945).
4. Id. at 19.
5. See id. at 14.
6. See Restatement of Torts, vols. 1 & 2 (1934); vol. 3 (1938); vol. 4 (1939).
7. See Leon Green, The Torts Restatement, 29 M1. L. Rev. 582, 584 (1933).
8. Id. at 584-85. Green had foreshadowed this attack in his seminal "duty" articles in
1929, in which he condemned "a habit of long standing to think of the rules and theories devel-
oped by courts as involving 'principles'" and of "insist[ing] upon the sanctity of principles" to
which "adherence must be given at all costs." Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence
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fication scheme, Green protested that it failed to appreciate the ten-
dency of doctrines "to run all over the field."9 And as to its "technique
of statement," he complained that "[t]he most striking feature of the
black letter sections... is their stiffness and pompousness of expres-
sion," "smother[ing]" "important ideas... in a welter of insignificant
ones raised by black letter to the same level of importance."1°
The Restatement made its way into judicial decisions and
classrooms over the 1940s and 1950s, and inspired a Second
Restatement, begun in 1954 under the leadership of William L.
Prosser as reporter." This ambitious project consumed literally a
quarter century; the 628-page fourth volume appeared, under the
crest of John Wade as successor reporter, in 1979.12
The advent of the first in a series of planned projects under the
heading of a Third Restatement, 3 focusing on products liability, gen-
erates an important threshold question: what task does a
"restatement of the law" set for itself at the end of a century that has
seen remarkable dynamism in the law as well as turbulence in soci-
ety?
One may identify three basic approaches to restatement. One
is relatively literal. At its most reductionist, it involves counting the
decisions and selecting the majority rule, at least where there are
enough decisions on a particular issue to justify calling the rule a
"majority" position.
But those who have wrangled over the contents of
Restatements for more than half a century would not be satisfied with
this answer. They would say that, since the purpose of Restatements
is to improve the law, restaters should seek wisdom and excellence in
their choice of legal rules.
It is worth pausing to identify the inarticulate premises here.
When one restates the law, one works with controversy. The job of
restatement does not begin until a number of litigants have been
sufficiently engaged on a legal issue to generate a body of argument in
appellate courts about that question.
Cases: II, 29 Colum. L. Rev. 255, 274, 280 (1929). I am grateful to Edmund Ursin for recalling
this passage to me.
9. Green, 29 11. L. Rev. at 588.
10. Id. at 591-92.
11. See Herbert Wechsler, Introduction to 1 Restatement (Second) of Torts viii (1965)
("Restatement (Second)").
12. 4 Restatement (Second) (1979).
13. See Restatement (Third) of the Law, Torts: Products Liability, Tentative Draft No. 1
(April 12, 1994) ("Restatement Draft).
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This implies that the problems at issue are real problems on
which well-trained lawyers disagree as experts. It suggests, further,
that the best way for society to deal with these problems is through
judicial development. This requires reasoned argument, over time,
focused on particularized issues against the background of precedent,
both within state bodies of law and across the nation.
One must stress this fact with respect to the issues that be-
come subjects of dispute in Restatement projects that deal with what
are essentially common law bodies of jurisprudence. The rules that
are the subject of these disputes are not, at least initially, barks on an
open political sea. Rather, they have been the subject of intense in-
terstitial argument, against the background of an assumption that
the everyday law of a federal republic is capable of logical progression.
This approach to the law-case-centered, incremental, and
focused on reasoned development-contrasts with a third approach to
restating the law. We might term this the frank legislative approach.
That approach assumes that a Restatement should be candidly re-
sponsive to competing political interests. Like a legislative
body-although without its socially conferred power-the Institute in
drafting a Restatement ultimately should seek a resolution that is
politically viable, so long as it is not constitutionally irrational.
One may discern the tensions between the second and third
approaches in the foreword written by the director of the ALI to the
first tentative draft for a products liability Restatement: "[T]he basic
task for legal formulation is to seek an appropriate balance, so far as
it can be realized in tort law, between providing reasonable protection
for consumer and worker interests and stating reasonably viable
standards of conduct for producers of goods."'1 4 This declaration care-
fully preserves the idea of "legal formulation," with its overtones of
reasoned development. It implies a legislative purpose in its frank
statement of the need to balance the interests of consumers and
workers and those of producers. It suggests the extraordinary burden
that a "Restatement" places on reporters, advisers, and ultimately the
members of the ALI in the 1990s: the burden of reconciling the de-
mands of law and politics.
14. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword to Restatement Draft at xiii (CHazard, Foreword").
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III. THE IDEA OF A PRODUCTS RESTATEMENT
A Springing Full-Blown: Section 402A
We have initiated a discussion of the general considerations on
which modern Restatements must be founded. The foregoing quota-
tion from the ALI's director, drawn from the emerging effort to draft a
products liability restatement, stimulates us to ask what ideas should
ground such an effort.
The implicit faith of the drafters of the First Restatement of
Torts, that one could cabin a subject called "torts" in one integrated
set of volumes,15 carried forward into the Restatement Second.
Herbert Wechsler, director of the ALI at the time, declared in his
introduction to the first volume of the Restatement Second that the
first Restatement had "been a vital force in shaping the law of torts,"
and said that the Restatement Second "preserves continuity with the
original edition but is enriched in both its content and its scope.' 16
The historical progression from first to second Restatement
was a relatively smooth transition. But it became especially evident
by the late 1960s that some Restatement Second provisions were
more equal than others. The most photographic of minds might re-
produce the 951 sections of the Second Restatement, but by 1970 one
of these had begun to stand out, a veritable Everest among a few
other relatively tall peaks and hundreds of foothills. This was a pro-
vision on a subject that did not have a name when the drafters of the
first Restatement began their labors. The name was "products liabil-
ity." The section was 402A.
Professor Prosser worked the laboring oar in the development
of this section, which passed through a series of tentative drafts and
triggered spirited discussion on the floor of the Institute.17 This proc-
ess culminated in a provision that imposed liability on sellers of prod-
ucts "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user"
even when the seller had "exercised all possible care in the prepara-
15. Holmes was quizzical. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 63 (Little,
Brown, 1963) (saying that "a general view... of the conduct which every one may fairly expect
and demand from every other.., is very hard to find").
16. 1 Restatement (Second) vii, ix (1965).
17. See, for example, ALI, 39th Annual Meeting- Proceedings 228-42 (1962) (reporting
arguments, for example, over the concept of "intimate bodily use" in the then current draft). For
a critical chronicle of this development, see George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise
Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. Legal
Stud. 461, 512-18 (1985). A highly condensed capsule of the process appears in Marshall S.
Shapo, 1 The Law of Products Liability 7.01[2] at 7-4 (Butterworth, 3d ed. 1994).
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tion and sale" of the product and even though there was no contrac-
tual relationship between the seller and the consumer.
A single, powerful synthesis informed this provision: Prosser's
insight that a substantial number of cases in the years before 1960
had effectively achieved a form of strict liability for defective products
under the heading of warranty. Prosser proposed, in a 1960 article,
that it would be appropriate to classify these cases under a tort la-
bel.1  As reporter, he led the process-some would say that he domi-
nated it-that enacted this view into the Restatement provision that
became Section 402A.
The section proved controversial from the beginning.
Predictably, some of the most wounded outcries came from the de-
fense bar.19 However, if one were to judge a Restatement by its ability
to state "rules ... operative in the great majority of our States," the
section proved remarkable in its ability to attract adherents. Through
the late 1960s and into the 1970s, it won support in most states.20
Whether or not tort history had supported its adoption, Section 402A
proved itself in the final marketplace for juridical ideas: the courts.
B. The Sixties and Seventies: An Idea Captures the Courts
Over the generation since the Institute's adoption of Section
402A, the courts have published more than nine thousand decisions
categorizing and rationalizing the law of products liability.21 They
have explored a long series of links in the distributional chain, from
manufacturers who place completed products in commerce 22 through
makers of components, large and small,23 and including those who
lease products,24 license their use under trademarks,25 or loan them
18. William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
Yale L. J. 1099, 1124-38 (1960).
19. See, for example, Thomas L. Dalyrymple, Brief Opposing Strict Liability in Tort
(Defense Research Inst., 1966).
20. See, for example, Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267, 271
n.3 (1977) (selectively listing decisions); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628
(1973) (listing decisions "imposing strict liability in favor of nonusers").
21. The CCH Products Liability Reporter, which reports cases by consecutive paragraph
number, began with 5,001 in Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) [Decisions, March 1963-June 19651. By
early 1995, it was at paragraph number 1 14,098. See Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH), Report Letter
No. 824 (Jan. 23, 1995).
22. See generally, Shapo, 1 The Law of Products Liability 1 12.03[1]-[5] at 12-6 to 12-18
(cited in note 17).
23. See id. 12.03[7][a] at 12-20 to 12-32.
24. See id. 1 12.08[1]-[2] at 12-59 to 12-66.
25. See id. I 12.03[8][a] at 12-32 to 12-36.
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for promoting the sales of other products.26 A separate body of law,
and commentary, has developed on the liabilities of those who sell
used products.
27
Further along the chain of distribution and commerce, the
courts have developed principles to govern the variations in status of
those injured when they use or encounter products. In this area, tort
law has maintained an uneasy coexistence with commercial law doc-
trine.2
In their functional analysis of the distributional and consumer
chains, courts have both drawn on relatively historic theories of liabil-
ity 29 and developed the new strict liability doctrine.30 The interplay
between these theories has been fascinating, as the courts have some-
times mingled them, sometimes paralleled them, and sometimes
found sharp contrasts between and among them.3'
In the course of the battles over the meaning of both new and
old doctrine, it has appeared that a crucial aspect of products liability
law-perhaps the core concept, if any one idea may be described that
way-lies in the definition of defect. If products liability law is a
mirror held up to our inner selves, and indeed a reflector of our cul-
ture,3 2 the defect concept provides a cameo of our beliefs about achiev-
ing "the good [through] goods."33  From a legal point of view, it is a
"multi-purpose separator of complex aspects of legal policy in products
liability questions."3
The practically oriented questions of what factors a jury should
receive as guides for determination of whether a product was defec-
tive-for example, balancing of risk against utility or the use of a
"consumer expectations" test-underlie the trench-level struggles over
what we as a society define as acceptable risk. These issues, along
with such questions as whether the plaintiff in a products case must
prove that the defendant could have employed a reasonable alterna-
tive design, are also at the heart of the policy arguments about the
content of the proposed new Restatement.
26. See id. 1 12.08E4] at 12-67 to 12-69.
27. See generally id., ch. 18.
28. See generally id., ch. 16 (discussing "the consumer chain").
29. See, for example, id., ch. 3 (express warranty), ch. 5 (negligence), ch. 6 (implied war-
ranty).
30. See, for example, id., ch. 7.
31. See, for example, id., ch. 26.
32. This is my argument in Marshall S. Shapo, Products Liability and the Search for
Justice (Carolina Academic, 1993).
33. Shapo, 1 The Law of Products Liability at vii (cited in note 17).
34. Id. 1 8.01 at 8-4.
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Litigation about fibers and chemicals that allegedly have
caused scores and even thousands of serious injuries, lawsuits that
arise when people become paralyzed from dives into above-ground
swimming pools, disputes about untoward effects ascribed to prescrip-
tion drugs-such cases and many others frequently resolve them-
selves into the question, 'Was the product defective?" In answering
that question, judges become a surrogate for the moral, as well as
economic, judgment of their fellow citizens.
Paralleling the issue of defect is the question of when and how
sellers must warn of the dangers of their products. A particularly
interesting set of arguments within the "duty to warn" issue, which
also insinuates itself into other doctrinal categories, arises under the
classification of dangers as "open and obvious." When courts bar re-
covery for injuries caused by "obvious" hazards, they use that concept
as a surrogate for a range of decisional elements.35
The complex rules on proof in products cases are also impor-
tantly representative of judicial concepts of justice-at least as impor-
tant as the liability theories and defect rules because their substan-
tive effects shine through their technical character. Judicial re-
sponses to issues of proof represent a difficult set of guesses on mat-
ters with important substantive consequences. In dealing with these
questions, courts must estimate probabilities in situations where they
do not have good statistical information, and they must make those
estimates in the context of other estimates: about the comparative
dollar costs of securing reliable information and the justice costs, both
measurable and unmeasurable, of guessing wrong.
C. Symbolic Confrontations in the Supreme Court
Emblematic of the emergence of products liability law as a
symbolically important area of American jurisprudence is the journey
of several products cases to the Supreme Court, a place where
"private law" litigation does not usually appear. The bedrock of prod-
ucts litigation in sellers' representations was evident in a plurality
holding by four Justices that federal cigarette legislation did not
preempt lung cancer claims "based on express warranty, intentional
fraud and misrepresentation, or conspiracy."36 Three other justices
35. See text accompanying notes 237-43.
36. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2625 (1992).
19951 639
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
took the position that Congress did not intend to preempt any damage
claims under state law37
The result of this judicial arithmetic was that, in addition to
permitting conspiracy claims, the federal statute did not bar actions
based on sellers' claims for their products that prove false. Viewed
against the current generation of products liability cases, the signifi-
cance of this holding is considerable, particularly with reference to the
doctrine of express warranty. That theory is, in fact, a strict liability
theory. It permits actions for statements purporting to be statements
of fact that turn out to be untrue, even though they do not come bur-
dened with the moral culpability that we tend to ascribe to
"intentional fraud and misrepresentation."
The lower court opinions that led up to the Supreme Court's
decision were substantively just as interesting. Judge Sarokin's sev-
eral opinions for the district court3  and the Third Circuit's compre-
hensive review of the case 9 inscribed important statements in the law
of express warranty. Illustrative was the court of appeals' response to
the manufacturer's advertising-so remarkable to modern ears-that
"stated, without qualification, that 'NOSE, THROAT, and Accessory
Organs [are] not Adversely Affected by Smoking Chesterfields.'"40
The continuing barrage of the manufacturer's safety representations
in those years featured the insistence by the entertainer Arthur
Godfrey, in a radio commercial, that a medical study "was proof" that
Chesterfields " 'never did you any harm."' 4 1 The Third Circuit
rejected the manufacturer's attempt to characterize these statements
as "represent[ing] only that short-term smoking was safe," and
declared that a "reasonable jury could infer that an unqualified
representation that smoking is safe creates a warranty that smoking
for a long period of time is safe."
42
With respect to the issue of whether the law required reliance
on such a warranty, subtle distinctions appeared in the opinions of
the district court and the court of appeals. Judge Sarokin, reviewing
the comments to the express warranty section of the Uniform
Commercial Code (the "UCC"), concluded that the test for reliance
was an objective one, rather than one centered on the subjective reac-
37. See id. at 2625-32 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
38. See, for example, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664 (D. N.J. 1986);
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 11,637 (D. N.J. Oct. 27, 1987);
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 208 (D. N.J. 1988).
39. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990).
40. Id. at 548.
41. Id. at 575.
42. See id. at 575-76.
640 [Vol. 48:631
RESTATEMENT PROJECT
tion of the buyer, and that thus "[w]hether or not the statement actu-
ally induced a particular purchase is not relevant to a determination
of whether the statement may constitute an express warranty."43
Judge Becker's opinion for the Third Circuit took a somewhat
different tack. He thought that the relevant state law, that of New
Jersey, would require a plaintiff to prove that "she read, heard, saw or
knew of the advertisement containing the affirmation of fact or prom-
ise."4" Within this framework, Judge Becker offered a two-edged
analysis: On the one hand, he said that the manufacturer might be
able to prove that the plaintiff "did not believe the advertisements
that she saw";45 on the other hand, he concluded that there were is-
sues of fact as to whether the plaintiff had "disbelieved the adver-
tisements.46
Similarly complex legal issues presented outcroppings in liti-
gations that engaged the Supreme Court on issues of proof and on the
kind of harm necessary to make a products case in tort, as well as on
an issue with especially high stakes for national defense. In one case
with ramifications far beyond the products area, the Court adopted
the approach of the Federal Rules of Evidence to questions of scien-
tific proof. Although it rejected the idea that expert testimony on
scientific questions must carry the imprimatur of general acceptance
in the relevant field, the Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. set out several criteria, including those of sub-
jection to peer review and publication, and the "falsifiability" of the
hypothesis at issue, as tests for the reliability of scientific evidence.47
In another decision, with a much tighter focus on products
jurisprudence, the Court barred tort recovery for economic loss in a
maritime case-an area in which the Court deals with private law
relatively frequently. Confronted with a case of malfunctions in ship
turbines that damaged the turbines themselves but no other property,
the Court insisted in East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica
Delaval, Inc. that such a complaint was "most naturally understood
as a warranty claim."48 Damage to the product itself, said Justice
Blackmun for a unanimous Court, meant "simply that the product has
43. Cipollone, 693 F. Supp. at 213-14.
44. 893 F.2d at 567.
45. Id. at 569.
46. Id. at 570.
47. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794-97 (1993).
48. East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 872 (1986).
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not met the customer's expectations, or, in other words, that the cus-
tomer has received 'insufficient product value.' -49
One other decision by the Court intermingled theorizing about
the rationales of tort law with considerations of military necessity. In
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,50 a five-Justice majority immu-
nized a government contractor against suits based on alleged design
defects in military equipment. The Court established this immunity
in situations in which the government had "approved reasonably
precise specifications" to which the product conformed, and the sup-
plier had warned the government of the dangers.51 Discerning a basis
for the immunity in the discretionary function exception of the
Federal Tort Claims Act, Justice Scalia declared for the majority that
decisions regarding the design of military equipment often required
"not merely engineering analysis but judgment as to the balancing of
many technical, military, and even social considerations, including
specifically the trade-off between greater safety and greater combat
effectiveness. ''52 A dissent by Justice Brennan attacked what he
viewed as the majority's premise "that any tort liability indirectly
absorbed by the Government so burdens governmental functions as to
compel us to act when Congress has not."53 By contrast, Justice
Brennan declared "[t]he tort system" to be '"premised on the assump-
tion that the imposition of liability encourages actors to prevent any
injury whose expected cost exceeds the cost of prevention."
D. Limiting Principles on Restatements
This cluster of Supreme Court cases, ranging across a spec-
trum of issues peculiar to products law but with implications beyond
it, underlies the densely fact-centered nature of products cases and
the level of controversy about the particulars of the law. It also indi-
cates the importance of providing room for courts to persuade one
another about the desirability of rules contributing to the develop-
ment of a vigorously evolving branch of the law. In current jargon,
there remains a steep learning curve for disputed issues of products
liability.
49. Id.
50. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
51. Id. at 512.
52. Id. at 511.




The Court's holding in East River, and subsequent judicial
reference to that precedent, are instructive in this regard. At a very
general level, the Court's analysis proved persuasive to a majority of
state courts and federal tribunals applying state law.55 In this sense,
the Court's power to persuade was impressive, especially so because
its decision in a case narrowly focused on maritime law influenced
courts dealing with cases spread across the landscape of products
liability.
However, even beyond the cases that disagree with East
River,5 other decisions in the wake of that case have indicated the
room for argument around the basic question. Exemplary of the pol-
icy tensions that arise in this area is the case in which a helicopter
owner sues for damages to the craft caused by a crash attributable to
a defect. Should a court allow tort damages to the craft owner when
lives were lost in the crash? Decisions of the same federal district
court have sliced some very fine distinctions on these questions.57
The case law thus teaches us caution in the effort at codifica-
tion of branches of the law in which dispute is still sharp and discus-
sion proceeds apace. This note of restraint must inform all efforts at
restatement. Because of the nature of the subject, it should cabin the
idea of a products Restatement in particular.
IV. THE EIGHTIES: A COMMON LAW SUBJECT BECOMES POLITICAL
As the refinement and extension of argument progressed
through the seventies and into the eighties, an overlapping historical
development appeared: the politicization of the law of products liabil-
ity. 'The law" as the original authors of Restatements viewed it, per-
55. See, for example, Aloe Coal Company v. Clark Equipment Co., 816 F.2d 110 (3d Cir.
1987), overturning the precedent of Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corporation v. Caterpillar Tractor
Company, 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981); Cooperative Power Association v. Westinghouse Electric
Corporation, 493 N.W.2d 661, 663-66 (N.D. 1992) (applying the East River analysis to a certified
question).
56. See, for example, Washington Water Power Company v. Graybar Electric Company,
112 Wash. 2d 847, 774 P.2d 1199, 1209 (1989) (criticizing East River for buying "increased
certainty" at "too high a price," downplaying "safety concerns," and threatening loss of "a
principal deterrent to unsafe practices").
57. Compare Comind, Companhia de Seguros v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 116 F.R.D. 397, 423-24
(D. Conn. 1987) (allowing insurer of helicopter to sue for destruction of craft in accident that
killed 14 people) with McKernan v. United Technologies Corporation, 717 F. Supp. 60, 66-67 (D.
Conn. 1989) (barring a suit for downtime and loss of income attributable to product
modifications to correct hazardous defect) with Icelandic Coast Guard v. United Technologies
Corp., 722 F. Supp. 942, 948 (D. Conn. 1989) (allowing recovery for expenses of rescuing
crewmen but not for replacement of aircraft, recovery of wreck, and loss of use).
1995] 643
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
haps more than it seems to us today, appeared to be capable of reduc-
tion to a set of rules-indeed, to "blackletter rules." Not that the
lawyers who labored on these early projects were unsophisticated
about the complexities of law in society.
In 1921, the incomparable Cardozo, a towering figure in the
early days of the Institute, had brilliantly set forth the way that law
relates to the social institutions that surround it.58 This insight de-
veloped over time with specific reference to torts. A generation later,
Green made clear in the crisp homespun prose of essays published in
1959 and 1960 that tort law was "Public Law in Disguise." 9 By 1986,
Fred Zacharias was describing a "Politics of Torts."60
Giving practical point to this recognition of the political nature
of a 'private law" subject were events swirling around the subject of
products liability. A benchmark in this history was the creation of the
Interagency Task Force on Product Liability, centered in the
Department of Commerce, in 1976.61 From that body came a compre-
hensive proposal for codification, in the form of model state legisla-
tion. This was the Model Uniform Product Liability Act, published in
1979.62
There ensued a perpetual conveyor belt of "reform" ideas,
regularly shuttling proposals for federal legislation on the subject to
Congressional committees. This parade of bills began in the late
1970s63 and continues to this writing.64 Hearings in several Senate
and House committees on the subject have provided a rich repetition
and extension of the controversy from the points of view of diverse
interest groups, state court judges, and academics.
65
58. See generally Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature Of The Judicial Process (Yale U.,
1921).
59. Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1959) and 38 Tex. L.
Rev. 257 (1960).
60. Fred C. Zacharias, The Politics of Torts, 95 Yale L. J. 698 (1986).
61. See Interagency Task Force on Product Liability, Dept. of Commerce, Final Report, I-1
to 1-4 (1978).
62. Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62714 (Oct. 31, 1979).
63. See, for example, Product Liability, Hearings on H.R. 5571, H.R. 1061 and H.R. 1675
before the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Product Liability Reform,
Hearings on S.2631 before the Subcommittee for Consumers of the Senate Commitee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
64. See, for example, The Product Liability Fairness Act, Hearing on S.687 before the
Subcommittee for Consumers of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, 103d Cong., 1st Sees. (1993).
65. See, for example, The Product Liability Reform Act, Hearing on S.1400 before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); Product Liability Reform Act,
Hearings on S.2760 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
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Even the processes of the ALI, originally conceived to "restate"
"the law" in a time when people had rather more confidence in what
"the law" was and that it was possible to "restate" it satisfactorily,
found themselves enmeshed in interest group appeals. According to
one report, besides receiving "comments and suggestions through the
traditional channels" of the Institute, the reporters for the products
restatement invited submissions from "groups such as the American
Bar Association, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, the
Defense Research Institute, and the Product Liability Advisory
Council."6
News accounts conflicted about the level of disagreement, and
even the existence of disputed issues. A pair of examples provide a
flavor of several tiers of controversy. Tentative Draft No. 1 for prod-
ucts liability (sometimes called "the Draft") appeared under a date of
April 12, 1994. An account in the BNA Product Safety and Liability
Reporter cited spirited argument between the reporters and Institute
members who expressed disagreement with the draft. For example,
co-reporter Aaron Twerski was paraphrased as saying that "what
some attorneys may unrealistically want is the ability to go into a
case without an expert," an assertion that American Trial Lawyers
Association president Barry Nace termed "garbage."67
Puzzlingly to at least an informed reader, two defense lawyers
wrote in the next week's edition of the same publication that although
"[m]any plaintiffs attorneys were deeply concerned that the Reporters
... would be in effect, creating federal product liability reform legisla-
tion to the detriment of injured plaintiffs," those lawyers "have indi-
cated that they are now satisfied with the Reporters and the process
by which this document is being created."68 These writers explained
that the reason for this evolving harmony was "that the Reporters
have made every effort to receive input from the plaintiffs bar and to
incorporate those views, if they agree with them, into the proposed
Restatement."6 9
Whatever misunderstandings may have existed about the level
of peace and contentment concerning the draft, one thing was clear:
Although the reporters were doing substantial amounts of case re-
66. Kenneth Ross and Hildy Bowbeer, U.S. Product Liability Law Undergoing Revision,
22 Product Safety & Liability Rptr. (BNA) 460, 460 (April 29, 1994).
67. Bruce S. Kaufman, Attorneys Spar Over Restatement (Third) of Torts: ATLA to
Mobilize Opposition to ALI Project, 22 Product Safety & Liability Rptr. (BNA) 436, 437 (April 22,
1994).




search and analysis on their own,70 they had become, perforce, brokers
of ideas advanced by contending political forces. As will appear, this
is a very difficult task.
Of particular interest in this regard is the foreword to the
Tentative Draft, written by Geoffrey Hazard, the ALI director. In this
document of less than a page and one half, Professor Hazard refers
thrice to the notion of balancing within the context of the idea that
products liability law has "become a public law subject."71 As noted
above, he refers, at one point, to the job of "seek[ing] an appropriate
balance" between "consumer and worker interests" and "reasonably
viable standards for conduct for producers. 2 Again, he speaks of the
reporters' task as "to express elementary legal concepts in language
that appropriately balances severely conflicting social concerns," and
commends the reporters for "work[ing] intelligently and conscien-
tiously to capture the proper balance. ' 3  He refers frankly to
"thoughtful advice from a wide range of commentators," including,
inter alia, "plaintiffs' and defendants' bar groups... and other inter-
est groups that have written us."74
V. A PROBLEM DEFINED: CONTROVERSY ABOUT THE LAW
The political arguments surrounding products liability throw
into relief the problem that confronts the effort to 'restate" this area
of the law. Those arguments, indeed, provide a frame for the ongoing
controversy about what the law is. Director Hazard's references to
the need for "balancing'7 5 only confirm the existence of that dis-
pute--or, rather, the many controversies in which courts are engaged
about dozens of details of products liability law.
Discussions among scholars have reflected the complex strata
of the problem. At a rather general level, some have focused on the
economics of products liability7 6 and others on its moral content,
77
70. For a random example, see Restatement Draft § 2, Reporters' Note, comment c, at 39-
55 (cited in note 13) (noting multiple cases and secondary research supporting a single comment
to the blackletter).
71. Hazard, Foreword at xiii (cited in note 14).
72. Id. A fuller quotation of this passage appears at text accompanying note 14.
73. Id. at xiv.
74. Id.
75. See text accompanying notes 14, 71-73.
76. See, for example, W. Kip Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability (Harvard U., 1991).
77. See, for example, David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law:
Toward First Principles, 68 Notre Dame L. Rev. 427 (1993).
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with this Author describing its development as a cultural mirror.78
Academic commentary has continued to flower on very specific dis-
putes about the law. Providing one set of examples are the arguments
over the appropriate point of reference for design defect-in particu-
lar, whether the crucial standard is a "risk-utility" standard, or one
focused on "consumer expectations," or a combination of the two.7 9
Another illustration appears in the disputes about whether it is ap-
propriate to apply a true strict liability to cases of alleged failure to
warn.80 The new Restatement project has forced to the fore the ques-
tion of whether a plaintiff suing for an alleged design defect must
show the existence of a reasonable alternative design.81
The fierceness of the battle about what the law is appears
sharply to the reader of products liability cases over time. One finds
the continuing dispute over the cultural significance of products liabil-
ity law, and its moral content, graphically mirrored in the different
linguistic, conceptual, and policy approaches of many states:
* Alabama, with its "extended manufacturer's liability doc-
trine";2
* Ohio, with its struggles over warranty and strict liability
concepts;83
* New Jersey, with its far-reaching extensions of strict liabil-
ity, even under the warranty label that preceded its adoption of the
78. See generally Shapo, Products Liability and The Search for Justice (cited in note 32).
79. Compare, for example, James A. Henderson, Jr., Renewed Judicial Controversy Over
Defective Product Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 Minn. L. Rev.
773 (1979) (advocating the risk-utility test) with F. Patrick Hubbard, Reasonable Human
Expectations: A Normative Model for Imposing Strict Liability for Defective Products, 29 Mercer
L. Rev. 465, 484-91 (1978) (positing "reasonable human expectations" as basis for "a more just
compensation system"). Compare Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer
Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 Va. L. Rev.
1109 (1974) (focusing on product promotion), commentary in Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword.
Understanding Products Liability, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 435, 476 (1979), Aaron D. Twerski, From
Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectations: Enhancing the Role of Judicial Screening in Product
Liability Litigation, 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 861, 898-99 (1983).
80. Compare, for example, the argument for a strict liability standard, even as to risks
about which defendants could not have known, in W. Page Keeton, Products
Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 Tex. L. Rev. 398 (1970) with James A. Henderson, Jr.
and Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to
Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 265, 271-78 (1990) (advocating negligence as the proper basis for
failure to warn).
81. See, for example, Restatement Draft § 2, Reporters' Note, comment d, at 55 (cited in
note 13) (saying, in a Reporters' Note, that "[aluthority for the proposition that plaintiff must
establish that a reasonable alternative design could have been adopted requires more than
direct citation to cases and statutes that specifically set forth that requiremen".
82. See, for example, Casrell v. Altec Industries, 335 S.2d 128 (Ala. 1976).
83. See Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977) (the state
supreme court's final approval of Section 402A).
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strict tort doctrine, and its legislative adoption of a standard inter-
preted to combine consumer expectations and risk-utility features;84
- California, with its progression from the invention of strict
liability for products through an inadequate "defect is defect" test
through the two-pronged defect standard of the Barker decision, and
its powerful stand against strict liability for prescription drugs;
85
- Montana, which recently held a marshmallow maker liable
for failure to warn of the danger of its product to children;86
* Massachusetts, with its persistent adherence to warranty as
the theory of choice for products cases;
87
- New York, with its tortured progression from warranty to
strict liability;8
* Oregon, with its ongoing conceptual arguments about the
meaning of defect and its emphasis on the distinction between
"product" and "conduct,"89 as well as its remarkable tradition of a
multiplicity of opinions presenting varied distinctions on controversial
matters;90
- Washington, with an independent tradition that has pro-
duced distinctive opinions on consumer expectations, 91 the duty to
warn,92 and liability for economic loss when dangerous hazards are
involved;93
- Nevada, with a recent opinion of particular interest on the
duty to warn and international hazard symbols;
94
84. Compare Santor v. A&M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) with
Dewey v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 577 A.2d 1239, 1252 (1990) (discussing N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 2A.58C-3a(2)).
85. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963);
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153 (1972); Barker v. Lull Engineering
Company, Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443 (1978); Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049,
751 P.2d 470 (1988).
86. Emery v. Federated Foods, Inc., 262 Mont. 83, 863 P.2d 426 (1993).
87. See, for example, Swartz v. General Motors Corporation, 375 Mass. 628, 378 N.E.2d 61
(1978).
88. See Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corporation, 12 N.Y.2d 432,.191 N.E.2d 81
(1963) (temporizing with implied warranty); Victorson v. Bock Laundry Machine Company, 37
N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275 (1975) (confirming strict liability as theory of choice).
89. See, for example, Heaton v. Ford Motor Company, 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967);
Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Company, 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
90. See, for example, Brown v. Western Farmers Association, 268 Or. 470, 521 P.2d 537
(1974) (four opinions).
91. Ryder v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Company, 91 Wash. 2d 111, 587 P.2d 160 (1978).
92. See, for example, Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson Baby Products Co., 117 Wash. 2d 747,
818 P.2d 1337 (1991).
93. See Washington Water Power Company o. Graybar Electric Company, 112 Wash. 2d
847, 774 P.2d 1199 (1989).
94. See Fyssakis v. Knight Equipment Corporation, 108 Nev. 212, 826 P.2d 570 (1992).
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- Illinois, with its continuing adherence to a consumer expecta-
tions test 95 and its complex law on the issue of whether a plaintiff
must show a reasonable alternative design; and96
* Pennsylvania, with its ongoing adherence to a "guarantor"
test for strict liability, and the lengthy warfare in its state and federal
courts on the point.97
My purpose in this very partial summary is to convey a sense
of the richness of the national dialogue on the subject. The differing
theoretical and conceptual approaches of state courts to the subject
seem to mandate that a Restatement provide maximum flexibility for
application of local doctrine. Early in the Draft, the reporters laid a
potential foundation for such an approach with their emphasis on
functional analysis, making it clear in their comments that the rules
on defect "are stated functionally rather than in terms of the classic
common law characterizations. ' 8 Yet their insistence on relatively
tight limitations on the definition of defect renders somewhat nuga-
tory their statement that once a claim meets the requirements of their
definitions, courts are free to use whatever doctrinal labels they
choose.9 9
The need to preserve flexibility for individual courts would
seem especially apparent when one considers the diverse rationales
advanced for liability for product injuries. The comments to Section
402A were especially broad-gauged in their development of the ra-
tionales for strict liability;10 in the Tentative Draft, the reporters
distinguish rather sharply between the rationales for liability for
manufacturing defects, on the one hand, and those supporting liabil-
ity for design defects and failures to warn.10 By contrast, the courts
have tended to be rather expansive in their statement of rationales
generally.102 Given judicial employment of the comments to Section
402A over the past thirty years, it is appropriate to preserve substan-
95. See, most remarkably, the interpretation of state law in Todd v. Societe Bic, S.A., 21
F.3d 1402 (7th Cir. 1994), discussed at text accompanying notes 294-97.
96. See the Reporters' summary, Restatement Draft § 2, Reporters' Note, comment d, at
56 (cited in note 13).
97. Compare, for example, Azzarello v. Black Brothers Company, Inc., 480 Pa. 547, 391
A.2d 1020 (1978) (spelling out meaning of "guarantor" terminology) with Merriweather v. E. W.
Bliss Company, 36 F.2d 42,44-46 (3d Cir. 1980) (distinguishingAzzarello).
98. See, for example, Restatement Draft § 2, comment j, at 30 (cited in note 13). See also
id. at xxi.
99. See id. § 2, commentj, at 30.
100. See, for example, Restatement (Second) § 402A, comments c, f.
101. See Restatement Draft § 2, comment a, at 10-13 (cited in note 13).




tial leeway for courts to choose the path of development of their un-
derlying premises.
Any consideration of the variegated articulations of both con-
cept and policy in this area must also take into account overseas de-
velopments. This seems especially important because critics of the
present body of products liability law have expressed such strong
concerns about the alleged destructive effect of the American law on
domestic producers.
One may observe, in passing, that this line of argument does
not take into account the subjection of foreign producers to American
law on a long-arm basis. A more central point is that the other prin-
cipal industrial powers have moved to relatively expansive concep-
tions of products liability. In particular, the products liability
Directive of the European Community (the "Directive")10 3 projects a
conception of strict liability that is, if anything, more extensive and
consumer-biased than virtually any American state jurisprudence.
The stark terms of Article 4 of the Directive require the plaintiff to
prove only "the damage, the defect and the causal relationship be-
tween defect and damage.' 10 4 Especially remarkable, by comparison
with the Tentative Draft, is the adoption by the Directive of a con-
sumer expectations test with a short list of "circumstances" to be
taken "into account," of which the first is "the presentation of the
product." 05 Beyond the legislative details of the Directive, however,
its most salient feature is the strength of the desire for consumer
protection reflected in its overall architecture.o6
Also of particular interest in a comparative vein is an
Explanation of Deliberation on the Products Liability System pro-
duced by the Civil Affairs Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Justice
(the "Explanation"). 0 7 The Explanation, discussing 'The Principle of
Strict Liability," announces a rule of liability for damage to "life, body
or property of others.., by the defect of the movable which the pro-
ducer produced and put into circulation.108
103. Council Directive 85/374 of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations
and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products,
1985 O.J. (L 210) 29.
104. Id. art. 4.
105. Id. art. 6(1).
106. See generally Marshall S. Shapo, Comparing Products Liability: Concepts in European
and American Law, 26 Cornell Int'l L. J. 279 (1993).
107. Civil Affairs Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Justice, The Explanation of the Result of
Deliberation by the Civil Law Committee of the Legislative Council of the Ministry of Justice
(Jan. 17, 1994) (copy on file with the Author). I am grateful to Mr. Jun Masuda, The Counsellor,




With respect to the definition of defect, it is noteworthy that
the drafters of the Explanation lamented "that it is practically diffi-
cult to stipulate a definition provision [for defect]," 109 and said that
"[i]n order to realize adequate resolution on tort liability in the case of
accidents resulting from defective products, it is appropriate to leave
interpretation to the application of practice."11O
Perhaps especially remarkable is a moral note that sounds in
the Explanation, focusing on "consumers' trust."'M This theme ap-
pears with reference to importers, those who place their trade names
or trademarks on products, and those "who have indicated that they
put the products into circulation as original sellers, exclusive sellers,
and so on, by putting to the products marks such as names, trade
names, trademarks and so on."112 These parties, the drafters say,
"shall be imposed defect liability because they have enhanced con-
sumers' trust in safety of products.""3 It is particularly interesting to
find these straightforward ethical pronouncements in a government
document of a competitor nation whose economic colossus has been
such a subject of concern for American foreign policy.
VI. STRATEGIES FOR RESTATING PRODUCTS LIABILITY-
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Against this background of developing law in both this country
and its principal industrial counterparts, I undertake to suggest some
basic ideas that should inform a "restatement" of the law of products
liability. In this section and the following section, which deals with
particular concepts now at issue in products law, I shall make refer-
ence to relevant parts of the Tentative Draft."1
A The Torts Frame
At the threshold, I refer to an important problem of framing.
This problem inheres in the fact that the strategy embodied in the
109. Id. 1 11(2), at 5.
110. Id., Note 2, subparagraph 2.
111. Id. 11(3), Explanation, sections a, b.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Although the reporters and Council have been revising specific language of the Draft
during the development of this Article, my critique focuses on the basic ideas and arguments
that will remain at play during the ALI's consideration of the subject over the next several




Draft departs rather dramatically from the overarching conception of
both the original Restatement of Torts and the Restatement Second.
The latter conception, premising that there is a general law of torts, is
implicit and indeed virtually explicit in Professor Wechsler's introduc-
tion, as director, to the first two volumes of the Restatement Second.
He says there that those volumes "initiate the publication of a thor-
ough revision of the Restatement of that subject," i.e., torts." 5 The
concept is also apparent in Professor Wechsler's references to "the law
of torts,' " 6 and to the phenomenon of "enormous change in torts, re-
flecting new conceptions of the social function of this branch of law.""
7
The rationale for isolating products liability as the first subject
for a Third Restatement, as formulated by director Hazard, focused on
the idea that this body of law was "socially important and technically
complicated.""18 The controversial nature of this branch of the law
surely was a motivating force in the decision to initiate the new
Restatement with the subject. Doubtless, a practical consideration
was that it would require enormous startup costs to restudy and re-
cast the general conception of tort law developed throughout the 951
sections of Restatement Second.
The die appears cast for the present strategy. Yet anyone
concerned for the intellectual coherence of the Restatement Third
must continue to look to the basic principles of tort law for clues to
the rules appropriate to a restatement of products liability." 9 This is
so, if for no other reason than the existence of all the rules embodied
in the 950 sections apart from Section 402A of the Restatement
Second, not to mention Section 402A itself. If there is a general law of
torts, then presumably courts concerned with products liability cases
will want to refer to that law when they confront especially difficult
cases in the borderlands of products litigation. All things being equal,
this would be the occasion for a comprehensive, foundations-up review
of the principles of tort law. Alia iacta est, one must remind res-
taters, the Institute, and the judiciary that the general law of torts
will overlook every sentence of a products restatement.
115. Wechsler, Introduction to 1 Restatement (Second) at vii.
116. Id.
117. Id. at ix.
118. Hazard, Foreword at xiii (cited in note 14).
119. I am grateful to Oscar Gray for an informal suggestion that has sharpened my view of
this matter. I do not tax him with the specifics of this argument.
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B. A Law of Products Liability
What are the characteristics of the law of products liability,
now sought for restatement? At their most general, they do indeed
partake of the general fabric of the law of torts. Products liability is
highly fact oriented, a phenomenon manifest in the case law on defect,
in issues of liability as they pertain to the position of parties in the
distributional chain, in problems involving alleged failures to warn,
and in questions of proof. In part because of this orientation, and also
in this way reflecting the general law of torts, products law requires
incremental development. It is a classic of case-by-case construction
of lines of precedents, which courts constantly test against their own
jurisprudence of the subject and'iindeed against the bodies of law
developing in other states. It is the very model of the cross-country
conversation about the law that is a salutary feature of American
jurisprudence.
Other factors grounding the law relate more specifically to the
process that brings products into sometimes injurious contacts with
members of society. Here, we confront the elements of product por-
trayal, the availability of information about risk, and power relation-
ships in the marketplace. We meet also the technological context of
modern products markets and the difficulties of proof that often con-
front consumers who attribute injuries to complex products.
A necessary theme in any restatement of products liability
would stress the need to weigh competing interests. At a general
level, this involves computing the costs of injuries, considering the
need to maintain incentives for the production of useful goods, and
figuring in the social cost of benefits foregone from products for which
manufacturers find the law to create prohibitive disincentives.
Another set of factors to be weighed includes the incentives that legal
rules will engender in both producers and consumers with respect to
care in production, distribution, and use. In this regard, the foreword
to the Tentative Draft explicitly deals with the need for balancing of
large social interests.120 The idea of balancing, of course, has provided
an ongoing motif in the general law of torts.121
In setting a strategy for restatement, one confronts an historic
tension between predictability and generality. Professor Hazard
120. Hazard, Foreword at xiii (cited in note 14), quoted more fully in text accompanying
note 14.
121. See, for example, Marshall S. Shapo, Changing Frontiers in Torts: Vistas for the 70's,




refers, in his foreword, to the need for "reasonably viable standards of
conduct for producers of goods.' 122 Precision is always a goal for those
who make and interpret the law. Yet one need only repair to the
standard of Section 282 of the Restatement Second to find one of the
most general statements in all the law: the definition of negligence as
"conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the
protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm."123
C. How to Restate a Controversial Area of the Law
The tension between the natural human striving for crisp prin-
ciple and the need for general statement leads to a simple guideline
for the restatement of controversial areas of the law: In our search
for certainty and predictability, we cannot avoid the need to preserve
judicial flexibility. We will make more specific this injunction, which
reflects significant differences of opinion between the reporters and
ALI members who take positions critical of the Draft. To take one
example at this point: When there is no clearly established judicial
preference for a single factor to house the defect issue-for example
the factor of risk-utility analysis-it would be much preferable to
leave the question to the courts for further development.
With respect to some issues where this strategy seems wise,
there simply is not enough sharply etched judicial opinion on the
subject. With respect to others, there is sharp dispute on particular
questions. Sometimes Restatements may successfully force the issue;
perhaps the classic example is the drafting of Section 402A itself.
However, concerning a subject about which there is both much texture
and much controversy, a restatement that strives for particularity of
ukase may achieve no more than the dignity of the decisions of a court
of a fifty-first state. Forfeiting whatever claim it may have to be an
authoritative pronouncement, it may reveal itself, in the words of a
correspondent, as no more than "a treatise written by a committee.124
D. Special Factors Associated with Restatements
In this connection, it may be well to mention some factual as-
pects of law reform peculiarly associated with the ALI's Restatement
process. The first set of these factors concerns the players on various
122. Hazard, Foreword at xiii (cited in note 14).
123. Restatement (Second) § 282.
124. I owe the phrase to David Robertson.
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stages of the drama; the second, which is interlinked with the first,
has to do with the format of a Restatement.
First, one should note that a document must pass through
several stages of draft and voting to become a Restatement.,
Appointed by the director of the Institute with the approval of the
Council or the executive committee,12 5 the reporters are the wheel-
horses for any Restatement project. It is they who are responsible for
the bulk of research and for generating the drafts that will be the
subject of discussion throughout the process. Because of the special-
ized demands of the law, the reporters must be persons learned in the
particular area, and naturally will hold opinions on many substantive
matters.
As has been noted, in matters as controversial as the products
Restatement project, the reporters' mailboxes become virtual legisla-
tive hoppers for proposals and comments from a wide variety of inter-
ested people, including interest group representatives.
Aiding the reporters are a set of advisers and a members con-
sultative group. The Institute names the advisers-nineteen of them
for the products restatement, a cross-section of judges, practitioners
and law professors. The consultative group is essentially self-nomi-
nated. The magnetic power of the subject of products liability is evi-
dent in the fact that the consultative group for products numbers just
about two hundred.126
The reporters meet periodically with the advisers, and sepa-
rately with the consultative group, usually with the director and
officers of the Institute in attendance. Discussion is often frank and
focused, although the writer can testify that the size of the
groups--even of the relatively small advisers platoon-presents a
problem in the logical development of ideas through exchange.
Whatever the substantive content of these discussions, it is clear that
the reporters must make their own judgments about both the frame-
work and the details of the draft.
After the advisers and the consultative group review a pre-
liminary draft, the reporters do a revision, which they submit to the
sixty member Council of the Institute ('the Council") as a Council
Draft. After the Council reviews that document, it may qualify for
submission as a Tentative Draft, Discussion Draft, or Proposed Final
Draft. The Institute emphasizes that "[alt each stage of the reviewing
125. See American Law Institute, By-laws 10.01 (1994).




process, a Draft may be referred back for revision and resubmis-
sion."127 The three thousand person membership of the Institute ul-
timately votes to accept or reject a final draft.
Of particular interest, as one analyzes this process, are the
differential levels of specialization at various stages of the process.
The reporters usually are experts who have served their time in the
metaphorical rowing galleys of the subject. Many of the advisers
possess a similar level of expertise, although some-many judges for
example-will be generalists. One may reasonably assume that be-
cause of the highly voluntary nature of attendance at consultative
groups, persons who come to those meetings have a strong reason for
doing so-born of academic or professional conviction.
The Council includes a highly selective group of jurists, prac-
ticing lawyers, and professors who, taken as a group, are generalists.
Although a few may have a particularized interest and expertise in
the subject of the Restatement-be it products liability or another
topic-most will not. This fact has the virtues of its vices, and vice
versa. While it tends to guarantee a fresh look at a subject, it also
creates a setting in which the principal actors are not in close touch
with the details in which the fabric of a subject resides.
The Institute itself is a many-faceted group that includes all
the major categories of persons in the other groups. An Institute
session that discusses, and perhaps votes on, a Draft will tend to
include many people who have a particular interest in the subject. An
important sorting principle, if not as predominant as with the consul-
tative groups in particular, is likely to be self-selection for a variety of
reasons. The membership that votes on a particular subject is likely
to include a relatively slight fraction of the total membership of the
Institute. In the first plenary discussion of the Tentative Draft on
products, on May 17 and 18, 1994, the total count on the three teller
votes ran between 272 and 303 persons.
128
A second important set of considerations relates to the format
of a restatement. This includes a hierarchy of rules and commentary.
Signally important is the blackletter, a brief, literally bold-faced
statement of a legal principle in a kind of codal fashion. Following
this are "comments," which seek to elucidate the meaning of the
blackletter, sometimes with illustrations. The illustrations often
encapsulate the facts of leading cases, but sometimes are rather fanci-
127. Id., inside cover, box.
128. See ALT Members Put Off Approval Until 1995 of Major Product Liability Provisions,
22 Product Safety & Liability Rptr. (BNA) 521, 522 (May 20, 1994).
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ful. "Reporters' Notes" present a body of research, principally in case
law but also statutes, that helps to explain the reporters' views. One
should note that when the Institute adopts a Restatement, it em-
braces not only the blackletter, but also the comments. 129 This is a
fact of particular interest, because the comments may include intri-
cate reasoning and rather controversial policy choices. In this regard,
one should note that the controversy about such disputed provisions
likely would divide many levels of commentators-not only members
of the Institute, but also judges and legislators who might address the
topic.
VII. CORE CONCEPTS IN A PRODUCTS RESTATEMENT
Having described the multi-level stage on which a Restatement
drama plays out, we turn now to an analysis of the principal concepts
that must inform a restatement of products liability.
A. The Idea of Reasonableness
A major governing standard for the Tentative Draft on prod-
ucts is an idea to which much of tort law frequently resorts: the idea
of reasonableness. The director's brief foreword epitomizes this ap-
proach in his reference to a search for a balance "between providing
reasonable protection for consumer and worker interests and stating
reasonably viable standards of conduct for producers of goods.' 130 He
remarks that the concept of reasonableness is "firmly established in
the law" of both warranty and negligence.'3' Very early in the Draft,
the reporters indicate that the important general sections on design
defect and warnings, as well as those on prescription drugs and de-
vices, "rely on a reasonableness test traditionally used in determining
whether an actor has been negligent."32 This emphasis makes clear
that one of the hoariest of torts concepts still possesses considerable
vitality, even given its high level of generality. That generality, in-
deed, provides a broad roof for competing schools of thought-for
129. See, for example, Wechsler, Introduction to 1 Restatement (Second) at ix (explaining
that the commentary was "no less carefully examined and debated by the Advisors, the Council
and Institute than the black letter rules themselves!).
130. Hazard, Foreword at xiii (cited in note 14).
131. Id.
132. Restatement Draft § 1, comment a, at 3 (cited in note 13).
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example, those who view tort law as principally a vehicle for efficiency
analysis and those who see it as embodying strong ethical content. 133
B. The Tripartite Division
Sections 1 and 2 of the Draft dictate its fundamental architec-
ture, which depends on three supporting pillars. Section 1, after
announcing a principle of liability applicable to one "who sells a defec-
tive product,' 134 says that "[a] product is defective if, at the time of
sale, it contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is
defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings."
135
Section 2 spells out the definitions for each element of this
tripartite classification scheme. Rather noncontroversially, it de-
clares that there is a "manufacturing defect when the product departs
from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised
in the preparation and marketing of the product."'' 3
The notion of a warnings defect appears in blackletter that
declares a product "defective because of inadequate instructions or
warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product
could have been reduced by the provision of reasonable instructions or
warnings... and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders
the product not reasonably safe."'
13 7
This formula helps to capture the fact that products come to
consumers with considerable information baggage. It would, perhaps,
sharpen this point if one were to note that the reason that instruc-
tions or warnings are "inadequate" sometimes inheres in the image
that accompanies the product to the consumer.
The warnings definition triggers a concern that one might view
as purely linguistic, but which may have important conceptual fea-
tures. This concern arises from the phrase "defects based on inade-
quate instructions or warnings." That language seems a misnomer.
The idea of defect, in plain English, connotes physical or chemical
properties inherent in a product. If the informational structure that
accompanies the product to market misleads the consumer about
those properties, then there may be grounds for seller liability. But
133. For a compendium of diverse rationales of tort law, see Special Committee on the Tort
Liability System, Towards A Jurisprudence of Injury: The Continuing Creation of a System of
Substantive Justice in American Tort Law, ch. 4 (A.B 3-, 1984) (M. Shapo, Rptr.).
134. Restatement Draft § 1(a) at 1 (cited in note 13).
135. Id. § 1(b) at 1.
136. Id. § 2(a) at 9.
137. Id. § 2(c) at 9-10.
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that is because the informational structure is inadequate; the physical
properties of the product remain the same.
One can welcome the effort to make the definition of defect
functional, and, in particular, one can be sympathetic to the attempt
to view the informational structure as part of the product itself. But,
suggesting that this is not simply a matter of taste, I would insist that
it would be better to view the image of the product created by the
seller as something that is conceptually different from the product
itself. Insofar as one can distinguish "manufacturing defects" from
"design defects," it is obvious that no manufacturer would want to
change the composition of a product that does not have a manufactur-
ing defect. And this would be so whatever informational structure
surrounds the product. If the properties of the product do not make it
unreasonably dangerous, or unsafe, then it is not "defective." The
failure to give adequate information about those properties is a sepa-
rate failing, but it is not a "defect."138
Undoubtedly, the central zone of dispute concerning defect is
Section 2(b) of the Draft, which I quote in full:
A product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by
the product could have been reduced by the adoption of a reasonable alterna-
tive design by the seller or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribu-
tion and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reason-
ably safe.
139
This section deserves extended comment with respect to both
its linguistic limitations and its broader implications. Preliminarily, I
wish to suggest a concern related to the basic tripartite classification
scheme. It is true that courts and commentators have found it con-
venient to separate manufacturing defects from design defects and to
distinguish both from liability for failure to provide information about
risk. I already have indicated my disagreement with the concept and
locution of a "warnings defect." Now, emphasizing my understanding
that the distinction between "manufacturing" and "design" defects is
often a practical one, I express my dubiety about casting the distinc-
tion as ironclad. Sellers engage in analogous decisionmaking when
they choose levels of product risk for the purposes of both design and
138. An Indiana appellate court appeared to recognize this point when it said, in effect,
that the issue of adequacy of warning does not fall within the realm of defect under the state's
products liability legislation. Jarrell v. Monsanto Company, 528 N.E.2d 1158, 1166 (Ind. App.
1988).
139. Restatement Draft § 2(b) at 9 (cited in note 13).
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quality control. In both cases, they are aware of the level of statistical
risk to which they expose the consumer.
The reporters confront this point directly. They declare that
"[t]he element of deliberation in setting appropriate levels of design
safety cannot be analogized to the setting of levels of quality control
by the manufacturer."40 They reason this way: In setting quality
control levels, a manufacturer "is aware that a given number of
products will leave the assembly line in a defective condition and may
cause injury to innocent victims who can generally do nothing to avoid
injury."'1' The reporters view the process of "deliberately drawing
lines with respect to product design safety" as being "different."4
2
They explain that "[a] reasonably designed product still carries with it
elements of risk that must be protected against by the user or con-
sumer," the risk being "appropriately transferred to a user population




The reporters' refusal to recognize the close parallel between
these two kinds of deliberation and choice renders their justification
an ipse dixit. Their explanation glosses over the problem when it
introduces the assumption that a product is "reasonably designed."
The salient point is that the choice of the level of design risk may
make the product unreasonably unsafe, just as a product with a
"manufacturing defect" is, as all would agree, unreasonably danger-
ous.
C. The Risk-Utility Test
These preliminary remarks about the potential flaws in the
reporters' presentation of the generally accepted tripartite structure
lead us to a consideration of the controversial ideas in the reporters'
definition and interpretation of the concept of design defect.
My first point, which concerns the "risk-utility" test, is tangen-
tial to two other points discussed immediately below: the need to deal
with the process of product promotion,14 and the reporters' derogation
of the notion of "consumer expectations" as a viable concept in dealing
with products defect litigation. 45




144. See text accompanying notes 165-71.
145. See text accompanying notes 173-88.
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The term "risk-utility" does not appear in the Draft's blacklet-
ter definition of a design defect. Rather, the reporters announce in
comment c that "[s]ubsection (b) adopts a reasonableness ('risk-utility'
balancing) test as the standard for judging the defectiveness of prod-
uct designs."'146 They immediately spell out this idea as including a
requirement that the plaintiff show that the defendant "failed to
adopt a reasonable alternative design,"' 47 a subject that merits sepa-
rate treatment.'4
The reporters declare that "[t]he balancing process requires a
comparison between a proposed alternative design and the product
design that caused the injury, undertaken from the viewpoint of a
reasonable person."'' 4 In a separate comment, they refer to a "broad
range of factors" that "may legitimately be considered in determining
whether an alternative design is reasonable and whether its omission
renders a product not reasonably safe."'150 These factors range from
"the magnitude of foreseeable risks of harm" and "the nature and
strength of consumer expectations" to "the effects of the alternative
design on costs of production" and on "product function," and they
include the "relative advantages and disadvantages of proposed safety
features, product longevity, maintenance and repair, esthetics, and
marketability."151
This formulation omits much that the history of products li-
ability law indicates would be highly relevant to the question of
whether a product design is "unreasonably dangerous," in the lan-
guage of Section 402A,152 or "not reasonably safe," in the language of
the Draft.153 Indeed, one might fairly say that it omits more that is
relevant than it includes. Indeed, the Draft arguably fences out of its
new formula some substantial parts of the law of negligence, as well
as of the law of strict liability. Moreover, it replaces the present focus
of the law on the product at issue with a preoccupation with the phan-
tom of the alternative design. Beyond that, by thus potentially ex-
cluding primary consideration of the risk and the utility of the prod-
uct at issue, it offers considerable room for bootstrapping products out
of the design defect category, no matter what their inherent hazards.
146. Restatement Draft § 2, comment c, at 15 (cited in note 13).
147. Id. at 16.
148. See text accompanying notes 189-97.
149. Restatement Draft § 2, comment c, at 16 (cited in note 13).
150. Id., comment d, at 19.
151. Id.
152. Restatement (Second) § 402A(1).
153. Restatement Draft § 2(b) at 9 (cited in note 13).
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In analyzing the Draft's spotlighting of the risk-utility concept,
we should note that language like "risk-utility," which the reporters
give a highly particularized meaning, has some much more general
connotations in tort law generally and products liability law in par-
ticular. Even taking the concept on its own terms, it provides a risky
foundation for sole reliance.
Certainly, tort law is full of the idea of weighing risk and util-
ity, or of comparing "risks and benefits." These terms, which courts
appear to use somewhat interchangeably, convey the idea that the
court should balance the danger of a particular activity or product
against the gains that it produces for society. In their initial analysis
of products cases, the courts have focused on the comparative risks
and utility of the product at issue rather than on those of an alterna-
tive design, either viewed by itself or as compared with the product at
issue. The California Supreme Court made this clear in its important
formulation of the second prong of its Barker test, when it said that "a
product may... be found defective in design if the plaintiff demon-
strates that the product's design proximately caused his injury and
the defendant fails to establish, in light of the relevant factors, that,
on balance, the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of
danger inherent in such design."'1 It is true that in some cases in
which they fix on a risk-utility test, courts have brought the relatively
low cost of an alternative design into the picture155 The focus of the
inquiry, however, has been the product at issue. Illustrative is a
Louisiana case in which the appellate court upheld a finding that an
automobile was not "dangerous per se" although its exhaust system
allegedly caused a fire. 16 Referring to the automobile as "the major
method of transportation.., in a highly mobile society," the court
concluded that "the danger-in-fact (fire resulting from extreme cir-
cumstances) [did] not outweigh the utility of the product."" 7
The idea that courts must at least begin by comparing the
risks of the product at issue with its benefits is strongly apparent in
the first two elements of a seven-factor analysis that Dean Wade
presented during the early exegesis of Section 402A. In this much
154. Barker v. Lull Engineering Company, Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443,456 (1978).
155. See, for example, Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 741 P.2d 1240, 1249 (1987)
(focusing on potential use of crash bars for motorcycle).
156. Bloxom v. Bloxom, 494 S.2d 1297, 1302 (La. App. 1986) (holding that where evidence
"negated the possibility of alternative products or design," "plaintiffs must demonstrate that the
product is unreasonably dangerous because of a failure to warn" or that "the danger in fact...




cited article in the Mississippi Law Journal,158 Dean Wade catalogued
first the elements of "[t]he usefulness and desirability of the prod-
uct-its utility to the user and to the public as a whole," and "[t]he
safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause injury,
and the probable seriousness of the injury."159 It was only in the third
and fourth elements of his list that Dean Wade referred to the rele-
vance of "[t]he availability of a substitute product" and "[t]he manu-
facturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product
without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to main-
tain its utility.160 Thus, this catalog, which has been quoted over and
over by the courts, preserves an initial focus on the product itself.
This point is important not only as it bears on the focus of the risk-
utility test, but also because of its implications for the question of
whether the plaintiff must always prove a reasonable alternative
design, 16' or may show more directly that a product is not reasonably
safe because of its combination of dangers and benefits.
Perhaps the most extraordinary feature of the Draft in this
regard is the fact that it arguably excludes the most significant as-
pects of negligence law as a balancing mechanism. One of the classic
formulations of the negligence standard-a founding rock for the use
of economic analysis in tort law-is the so-called Learned Hand test.
Judge Hand set forth this idea in his opinion in United States v.
Carroll Towing Co.162 That 1947 decision defined the duty of a barge
owner to secure his vessel, with respect to the risk that it would break
from its moorings, as depending on whether the "burden of adequate
precautions" for avoiding the accident was less than the probability
times the gravity of the injury. 63
So far as one can tell, the Draft simply does not allow for the
possibility that a seller might be liable if it sells a product whose
configuration is such that the only feasible way to avoid its dangers
would be to adopt a substitute, rather than an "alternative design," or
to forego manufacture of that product.
By contrast, under a reasonable interpretation of a test that
urges a comparison of risk and utility, one should be prepared to call
158. John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L. J. 825
(1973). Citations to this article now occupy more than six full columns in Shepard's Law Review
Citations, see id. at 851-52 (4th ed. 1986); 419 (1986-1990 Supp.); 520 (Jan. 1995 Supp.).
159. Wade, 44 Miss. L. J. at 837.
160. Id.
161. See text accompanying notes 189-97.
162. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
163. See id. at 173.
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defective any product that is likely to cause damage beyond its meas-
urable utility, without reference to possible design alternatives.
Even if one accepts a risk-utility formulation as representing
the weight of case law, one must remark on the paucity of quantifica-
tion in the opinions. To be sure, now and then courts do muster dollar
figures concerning the cost of safety features,'6 but this is the excep-
tion rather than the rule. I make this point to underline the fact that
the seeming mathematical precision of the term "risk-utility" is illu-
sory.
D. Product Promotion
One of the most glaring omissions in the Draft, from the point
of view of what everyone (including lawyers) knows, is its lack of
positive reference to the process of product promotion, a central fea-
ture in the decision of consumers to use or encounter products. 16 5 I
have spelled out at some length the centrality of this factor, not only
in the common experience of all members of this society but in the
case law. The reporters generously credit the source, but principally
for the relationship of the argument to the "consumer expectation
test."1 66 I suggest that it would be well for any Restatement of prod-
ucts liability to acknowledge the pervasiveness of product promotion
in consumer decision making. Products come to the consumer with an
image, and a meaning, attached to them. The sources of this meaning
include sales literature, media advertisements, and even the uses to
which significant numbers of consumers put the product-the last
being a point picked up by advertising in what becomes a continuing,
and profitable, cycle.
We have noted that the European products liability Directive
places this factor at the center of its defect definition: it lists "the
presentation of the product" as the very first factor under its declara-
tion that "[a] product is defective when it does not provide the safety
which a person is entitled to expect."167 As I have suggested else-
164. Compare, for example, Valk Manufacturing Company v. Rangaswamy, 74 Md. App.
304, 537 A.2d 622, 628 (1988) (specifically comparing $2.5 million injury cost with cost of
accident avoidance feature calculated at $7) with Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 525 P.2d 125,
130 (1974) (noting that proposed design alteration for auto hoods would cost $5 to $10 per car,
and that there had been only 6 or 7 inadvertent hood openings reported in period of 7 or 8
years).
165. See Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine,
Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 Va. L. Rev. 1109 (1974).
166. See Restatement Draft § 2, Reporters' Note, comment a, at 36 and comment c, at 44
(cited in note 13).
167. Directive, art. 6(1) (a) (cited in note 103).
664 [Vol. 48:631
RESTATEMENT PROJECT
where, this is entirely appropriate to a regime of products liability law
designed for an age of technology, for the development of modern
techniques of consumer persuasion parallels the increasing complex-
ity of products.
168
This emphasis on product image appears, presciently, in some
of the decisions of the late 1950s and early 1960s: the Ohio Supreme
Court's reference in an express warranty decision to advertising de-
scriptions of "the worth, quality and benefits" of products in "glowing
terms and in considerable detail";19 the New Jersey Supreme Court's
spotlighting in Henningsen of the "advent of large scale advertising by
manufacturers";170 Justice Traynor's insistence in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products that "it should not be controlling whether plaintiff
selected the machine because of the statements in the brochure, or
because of the machine's own appearance of excellence that belied the
defect lurking beneath the surface, or because he merely assumed
that it would safely do the jobs it was built to do.'1' An emphasis on
product portrayal and product image, therefore, represents a synthe-
sis of case law as well as of common experience and common sense.
E. Access and Capability Concerning Information
Our observations about the necessity of recognizing the process
of product promotion lead us to remark about the need to recognize,
more explicitly than does the Draft, the importance of access to in-
formation and the ability to use it. The Draft's provision on warnings
implicitly takes these factors into account. But it would be well to
highlight the importance of these factors throughout the law of defect,
a point apparent when one attempts an overall synthesis of this body
of law.172 It is a commonplace that knowledge is power. The point
takes on bold face when we consider the power inherent in informa-
tion about the science and the technology of products.
F. Consumer Expectations
A lamentable defect in the reporters' analysis lies in its down-
grading of consumer expectations as a factor in judging design defect
issues. Driven by their certainty that "risk-utility" is the sole central
168. Shapo, 26 Cornell Intl L. J. at 292 (cited in note 106).
169. Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612, 615 (1958).
170. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 77 (1960).
171. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 901 (1963).
172. See generally, for example, Shapo, 60 Va. L. Rev. at 1293-1362 (cited in note 165).
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element for determining defect, the reporters insist that "consumer
expectations do not constitute an independent standard for judging
the defectiveness of product designs."'' 7 They specifically distinguish
their views of manufacturing defects, proof of which, they specify,
turns on the failure of a product "to function as a reasonable person
would expect it to function."7 4
The defect in the reporters' analysis is manifest in at least two
respects. The first point flows from our, emphasis above on the cen-
trality of product promotion in consumer choice. A lack of recognition
of the importance of product portrayal and product image leads to a
lack of appropriate emphasis on the expectations that consumers
reasonably develop about products.
The second point is more descriptive. It concerns the question
of what the law is. The reporters argue forthrightly that "[ain over-
whelming majority of American jurisdictions rely on risk-utility bal-
ancing in design cases.' ' 7 However, the authorities to which they
make abundant reference leave considerable room for interpretation.
Two published articles take issue with the reporters' assertion on this
point.176 This writer's informal, independent analysis of fourteen of
the cases, done as stringently as possible, yielded as many as ten
nuances among those decisions. I found only one to three decisions
that give unequivocal support-or come close to giving unequivocal
support-to the proposition that a risk-utility test is the sole or
predominant ground of reliance by American courts.'"
173. Restatement Draft § 2, comment e, at 23 (cited in note 13).
174. Restatement Draft § 3 at 80. For the reporters' exegesis on this distinction, see id. at
23-24.
175. Id. § 2, Reporters' Note, comment c, at 39.
176. See Roland F. Banks and Margaret O'Connor, Restating the Restatement (Second),
Section 402A-Design Defect, 72 Or. L. Rev. 411, 415-20 (1993); Howard F. Klemme, Comments
to the Reporters and Selected Members of the Consultative Group, Restatement of Torts (Third):
Products Liability, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1173, 1173-76 (1994).
177. The universe I selected was 14 decisions that a critic, see Klemme, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. at
1177-82, had identified as "non-supporting cases" for the reporters' assertion that "[an
overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions rely on risk-utility balancing in design cases,"
Restatement Draft at 39 (cited in note 13).
I proceeded this way: I asked my secretary to type out the citations of the 14 cases. I put
this list on the shelf for a few days. I then went to the library and pulled each reporter. I read
the cases without reference either to the reporters' capsule commentaries or to Rlemme's
interpretations, asking what test the court had used for defect.
The results were not neatly categorical, as the catalog below reveals. All that need be said
here, by way of commentary, is that the cases certainly are not confirmatory of the broad
proposition for which they are advanced by the reporters. Indeed, they fall along a continuous
spectrum often categories.
The list below sets out the ten categories, which I present as a spectrum from cases least
confirmatory of the reporters' argument to those most confirmatory. I preserve my informal
terminology with reference to the question of whether the decisions were confirmatory:
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Perhaps symbolically, in the days leading up to the Institute's
first plenary meeting on the Draft, the Seventh Circuit capped a time-
consuming set of arguments on the subject with a reading of con-
sumer expectations as the principal ground of reliance for Illinois
law.178 One could easily multiply variations on the theme, with some
courts adhering outright to a consumer expectations test and others
ruling that the consumer expectations test and a risk-benefit or risk-
utility test are not exclusiveY7
9
Representative of the ways in which expectations condition the
defect decision are cases holding that custom imposes certain kinds of
risks on purchasers. 8O There is even some authority that indicates
that "consumer contemplation" language may be tailored to fit cases
involving "bystander" plaintiffs. 8, An Indiana appellate decision,
construing such language in the state products liability statute,
thought it could "give reasonable meaning to the requirement" by
(1) "No"
(a) Skyhook Corporation v. Jasper, 90 N.M. 143, 560 P.2d 934 (1977)
(b) Casrell v. Altec Industries, Inc., 335 S.2d 128 (Ala. 1976).
(2) "Probably not"
Griebler v. Doughboy Recreational, Inc., 160 Wis. 2d 547, 466 N.W.2d 897 (1991).
(3) "Arguable"
Radiation Technology, Inc. v. Ware Construction Company, 445 S.2d 329 (Fla. 1983).
(4) "Not clear to arguable or questionable"
McCollum v. Grove Manufacturing Company, 58 N.C. App. 283, 293 S.E.2d 632 (1982).
(5) "Not clear"
(a) Miller v. Todd, 551 N.E.2d 1139 (Ind. 1990)
(b) Peterson v. Safiway Steel Scaffolds Company, 400 N.W.2d 909 (S.D. 1987).
(6) "Balanced to no"
Turner v. General Motors Corporation, 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
(7) "Balanced, for example, between consumer expectations and risk-utility, or with other
factors"
(a) Phipps v. General Motors Corporation, 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976).
(b) Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, AG., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974) (interpreting
Virginia law).
(c) Nichols v. Union Underwear Company, Inc., 602 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1980).
(8) "Balanced to fully supported" (the term "fully supported" being represented in my notes
by a check mark)
Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, A Division of American Cyanamid Co., 112 Idaho 328,
732 P.2d 297 (1987).
(9) 'Flly supported to ambivalent"
Back v. Wickes Corporation, 375 Mass. 633, 378 N.E.2d 964 (1978).
(10) "Fully supported"
Hull v. Eaton Corp., 825 F.2d 448 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
178. Todd v. Societe Bic, S-A, 21 F.3d 1402 (7th Cir. 1994), discussed at text accompanying
notes 294-97.
179. See, for example, Besse v. Deere & Co., 237 IM. App. 3d 497, 604 N.E.2d 998, 1001
(1992).
180. See, for example, Two Rivers Co. v. Curtiss Breeding Service, 624 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir.
1980) (defective bull semen, custom imposes risk of genetic defects on herd owners).




"readily assum[ing] that the using or consuming public neither in-
tends nor desires to cause undue injury to ... foreseeable bystand-
ers."182 From this premise, the court reasoned that when a product
"presents an unreasonable danger to foreseeable bystanders, and the
unreasonableness of the danger is not contemplated by the user, we
may properly say the requirement has been met."183
The reporters themselves recognize the power of a consumer
expectations analysis in one discrete area-that involving the contro-
versy over injurious objects in food products, for example, pieces of
bone in chicken or meat. One of their most recent formulations on the
subject declares that "[a] consumer expectations test in this special
context rests upon culturally defined, widely shared standards which
good products ought to meet."'8 I applaud this recognition that the
law of products liability is a cultural mirror,185 but I suggest that the
reporters are insufficiently cognizant of the power of this idea beyond
the narrow compass of chicken bones in enchiladas.
One should stress that there is no reason that a court cannot
blend "consumer expectations" or "consumer contemplation" analysis
with a "risk-utility" concept. Some courts have, in fact, done this.186
My principal point is that a Restatement should recognize explicitly
the centrality of the process of product promotion in creating and
conditioning consumer choices. I would add that a less exclusivist
approach would avoid the artificiality of the reporters' efforts to estab-
lish consumer expectations as a "factor" to "be considered in determin-
ing whether an alternative design is reasonable,"87 and as "one factor,
among many, in risk-utility balancing." 88
G. The Requirement of a Reasonable Alternative Design
As distressing as the reporters' decision to relegate the con-
sumer expectations test to the supporting cast is their insistence that
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Restatement (Third) of the Law, Torts: Products Liability, Council Draft No. 2 § 2,
comment g, at 38 (Sept. 2, 1994) ("Council Draft No. 2").
185. See, for example, Shapo, Products Liability And The Search For Justice at 198 (cited
in note 32). See generally Marshall S. Shapo, In the Looking Glass: What Torts Scholarship
Can Teach us About the American Experience, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. _ (Summer 1995)
(forthcoming).
186. See, for example, Phipps v. General Motors Corporation, 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955,
957-63 (1976); Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1071-73 (4th Cir. 1974);
Nichols v. Union Underwear Company, Inc., 602 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Ky. 1980).
187. Restatement Draft § 2, comment d, at 19 (cited in note 13).
188. Id., comment e, at 23.
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plaintiffs in design cases must show that the risks of a product "could
have been reduced by the adoption of a reasonable alternative de-
sign." 9 In this discussion of the crucial deficiencies in this require-
ment, I elaborate on concerns briefly mentioned above. 190
My remarks go to the application of both strict liability and
negligence theories, as well as warranty law, to design defect cases.
First, concerning the theory of strict liability: There is nothing in the
language of Section 402A, to which an overwhelming majority of
courts subscribe in design defect cases as they do in products liability
cases generally, that would remotely support a requirement that the
plaintiff show a reasonable alternative design.
Second, it would appear that the Draft's alternative design
requirement conflicts with the general standards of implied warranty
law-which, after all, is statutory under the UCC. Section 2-314 of
the UCC, which establishes the standard for implied warranty of
merchantability, includes six conjunctive elements, none of which
faintly signal that a claimant must show an alternative design.191
Third, the requirement may be read to put aside the weighing
inherent in the general body of negligence law in favor of a highly
specific requirement. One may refer, in this regard, to the definition
in Restatement (Second) Section 291, which declares that when there
is a recognizable risk of harm, "the risk is unreasonable and the act is
negligent if the risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law
regards as the utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it
is done."'192 This formula makes clear that courts deciding negligence
cases should weigh the risk and utility of the allegedly culpable act in
question, without necessarily making reference to alternative courses
of conduct.
An astonishing result of the Draft's requirement is that a
plaintiff could show that the risks of a product outweigh its utility
and still not prevail if the plaintiff is unable to show a reasonable
alternative design. Because product manufacturers are by definition
experts in product design and consumers are not, it seems perverse to
argue that consumers should be required to prove both that an alter-
native design exists and that it is a reasonable one. A consumer con-
189. Id. § 2(b) at 9.
190. See text accompanying note 161 and text following note 163.
191. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1990). I am indebted to Oscar Gray for emphasizing this point to me.
For a more general discussion of the relationship of a products restatement to the UCC, see text
accompanying notes 233-36.
192. Restatement (Second) § 291.
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fronted with such a requirement might well say to the manufacturer
that argued in its favor, "I thought that was your job."
We already have noted that there is a siren attraction to the
suggestively quantitative overtones of the "risk-utility" formula. One
should add, however, that any frequent reader of negligence cases is
aware that the definition of negligence has substantial moral compo-
sition. Try as advocates of economic analysis might to force negli-
gence law into an efficiency framework, the fact is that courts reach
beyond notions of economic optimality in making judgments about
acceptable levels of risk. Although courts sometimes do focus on an
efficiency-oriented brand of deterrence, on other occasions it is clear
that their commitment to deterrence is a moralizing one.193 One could
tease this mode of judicial operation into the language of Restatement
Section 291 by arguing that the concept of "utility" has components of
social as well as economic judgment.94 But, however, when one
parses the words, the reality is that the idea of "risk-utility" compari-
sons involves judgments of legal, rather than economic, craft.
One of the most disturbing features of the reporters' commit-
ment to a requirement of an alternative design is its tendency to allow
defendants to create litigation-proof categories of product. One might
epitomize this tendency by saying that the alternative design re-
quirement permits a defendant to argue, on behalf of its product, "I
am a product, therefore I have no design defect." Fleshed out a little
bit, this formula would read, "I am a very special kind of product, and
there are no reasonable alternative designs that do what I do; there-
fore, I am not defective."
There are some specialized product categories for which this
argument arguably works pretty well. A good example would be a
vehicle designed to carry a lot of passengers and luggage, which has a
rear engine and sacrifices front-end collision protection in favor of
more room for people and cargo. 95 Different persons might use vari-
ous terms to explain a result for defendants in cases of this kind.
Some might say "no negligence," others would intone, "no breach of
merchantability," still others would say, "no defect," and another
cadre of analysts would repeat the mantra "open and obvious."
193. See Special Committee, Towards a Jurisprudence of Injury at 4-3 to 4-12 (cited in note
133).
194. Restatement (Second) § 292(a) in fact identifies, as a relevant factor in determining
"the utility of the actor's conduct," "the social value which the law attaches to the interest which
is to be advanced or protected by the conduct."




Perhaps the most direct explanation would be that the purchaser of
such a product would know exactly what she was getting for the price,
including a particular package of risks and benefits, and made a
choice in favor of that package.
Beyond that justice-centered explanation, one should add, it is
not at all clear that the case law supports a requirement that plain-
tiffs show an alternative design. The reporters contend that it does;196
a memorandum circulated by Professor Frank Vandall presents a
strong brief on the other side.197 As a matter of counting jurisdictions,
the point seems at least arguable.
H. Products That Are Simply Too Dangerous
A controversial byproduct of the alternative design require-
ment lies in its apparent bar to the argument that a product is unrea-
sonably dangerous because of its very high degree of risk. The
Institute adopted an ameliorating amendment at its 1994 annual
meeting, permitting a court to hold a product "defective because the
extremely high degree of danger posed by its use or consumption so
substantially outweighs its negligible utility that no rational adult,
fully aware of the relevant facts, would choose to use or consume the
product."198 Apart from this apparently rather limited exception to
the alternative design requirement, the reporters evidently would
contend that one should not be able to argue that a product is so dan-
gerous as to be defective because of its particular risk characteristics.
This argument is a corollary to the bootstrapping argument, "I am a
(particular) product; therefore, I cannot be defective."
The most serious problem with this approach is that it could
exclude from the defect category some products with the greatest
harmful potential for large numbers of consumers. The most striking
examples, indeed, are products that have been the subject of "mass
tort" litigation.
A prime illustration is asbestos. It is true that many asbestos
cases have focused on a theoretical framework of failure to warn. 99
Yet some decisions have raised directly the proposition that a product
196. See Restatement Draft § 2, comment d, at 55-62 (cited in note 13).
197. Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2(b):
The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1407 (1994).
198. ALI, Restatement (Third), Torts: Products Liability, Tent. Draft No. 1, Addendum 1
(May 25, 1994).




could be "unreasonably dangerous per se."200 The Louisiana Supreme
Court included in this classification situations in which "a reasonable
person would conclude that the danger-in-fact of the product, whether
foreseeable or not, outweighs the utility of the product."201
The Missouri Supreme Court referred to the general recogni-
tion of the dangers of asbestos in a 1991 decision; it observed that
asbestos as an insulating material was "considered so dangerous" that
asbestos insulation had not been sold since the early 1970s. 202 Indeed,
the Missouri court noted that one defendant arguing for a risk-utility
definition of '"nreasonably dangerous" had not attempted "to show
that its product had such utility that it could be rendered reasonably
safe by an adequate warning.'
'203
I focus on these decisions because asbestos, the subject of hun-
dreds of thousands of lawsuits, is a product for which, in the ordinary
use of language, there is no "reasonable alternative design." There
are undoubtedly substitutes-other materials that can be used to
provide insulation. But one cannot improve on asbestos as an insulat-
ing fiber in a way that is analogous to changing a mechanical design
to make it safer. It appears that the Draft would rule out any finding
that a product like asbestos is unreasonably dangerous for just that
reason. This choice, I submit, is one unreasonably dangerous to soci-
ety. It also flies in the face of the enormous current of litigation that,
whatever its doctrinal base, has effectively been founded on the ex-
treme hazards to health inherent in the use of asbestos as an insulat-
ing material.
The Dalkon Shield, also a generator of many thousands of tort
suits, presents a closer question, for there existed arguably safer
substitutes. On this issue, we may consult Peter Huber, a leading
critic of the tort liability system and of products liability law in par-
ticular. Huber flatly declared that the "Dalkon Shield without ques-
tion deserved to go .... ,,204 What he lamented was that although "that
particular IUD unquestionably was inferior[,] . .. it was... all too
easy to condemn IUDs in general, which courts and juries promptly
did. .. "205
200. See, for example, Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corporation, 484 S.2d 110, 113-14
(La. 1986) (responding to certified question in 752 F.2d 124, 755 F.2d 393 (en banc) (5th Cir.
1985)).
201. Id. at 114.
202. Hagen v. Celotex Corporation, 816 S.W.2d 667, 674 (Mo. 1991).
203. Id. (remanding judgment against that defendant for more evidence on causation).
204. Peter W. Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution & Its Consequences 162 (Basic Books,
1988).
205. Id. at 50.
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Yet it is not an inherent characteristic of new types of products
that there should be alternative designs for them. One can easily
visualize a situation in which a Dalkon Shield-type product is the
"only game in town"--in which it defines the product class. Yet the
Draft apparently would rule out a suit against such an
"unquestionably inferior" product, one that "Without question de-
served to go." At one point, Huber declares that "[t]he Dalkon Shield
certainly was a bad IUD."06 Suppose it were the only IUD. Should
that immunize it from suit?
One might raise an analogous set of questions about one of the
newest apparitions on the mass tort front: silicone gel breast im-
plants. Although recent medical evidence suggests that these prod-
ucts do not significantly increase the medical risks of women to whom
they have been prescribed, 207 the willingness of several major corpora-
tions to pay billions of dollars in settlement of implant suits2 08. pro-
vides at least an inference that these products might have been held
unreasonably dangerous in tort suits. The Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") recently limited the use of silicone gel filled
implants to patients for whom saline-filled, silicone inflatable im-
plants are "medically unsatisfactory."209 If there were no alternative
of saline-filled inflatable implants, does the Draft imply that silicone
gel implants would be fully immunized from suit? Indeed, does the
Draft mean that the use of a product for cosmetic purposes on a lim-
ited population should be immunized from litigation because there is
no other way to achieve the same result?
Particularly interesting in this regard was a finding by the
FDA in 1990 that a reasonable amount of knowledge existed about the
risks and benefits of silicone gel implants, but that there was insuffi-
cient valid scientific data to support a risk/benefit analysis.210 What
would be the appropriate interpretation of Draft Section 2(b) in these
circumstances, if there was no alternative product that achieved the
purpose fulfilled by silicone gel implants? The case is a classic one of
206. Id. at 108.
207. See Sherine E. Gabriel, et al., Risk of Connective-Tissue Diseases and Other Disorders
After Breast Implantation, 330 N. Eng. J. Med. 1697, 1701 (1994). But compare Sidney Wolfe
and Joanne C. Mott, letter, N.Y. Times A16 (June 28, 1994) (remarking on small size of sample).
208. See, for example, Gina Kolata, 3 Breast Implant Makers Agree to Pay $3.7 Billion, N.Y.
Times A28 (Feb. 20, 1994).
209. General and Plastic Surgery Devices; Effective Date of Requirement for Premarket
Approval of Silicone Inflatable (Saline-Filled) Breast Prosthesis, 59 Fed. Reg. 23,037 (1994) (to
be codified at 21 C.F.R. Part 878).
210. General and Plastic Surgery Devices; Effective Date of Requirement for Premarket




what I have called '"market experimentation,"211 the well-accepted
ongoing process of mass market tryouts of new products on consum-
ers.
Consider a situation in which a manufacturer engages in mar-
ket experimentation, with some inkling but not definitive knowledge
of dangers of a product in addition to plausible reasons for believing
that it will fill a market niche.212 Assume that after the product has
been on the market for a few years, it transpires that it is responsible
for several thousand injuries. In such a situation, almost by defini-
tion, it would be impossibly theoretical to speak of a reasonable alter-
native design. If there were one, presumably any rational manufac-
turer would have chosen it. What the manufacturer did was make a
choice; perhaps not a choice that was probably negligent, but one with
dangerous aspects and one that proved to be disastrous for thousands
of people. Why should an unknowledgeable plaintiff have to design a
winning product in order to recover in tort? In such a situation it
would seem inappropriate, and indeed unjust, to require plaintiffs to
show a better way. Again, it might seem appropriate for the con-
sumer to remark to a manufacturer, "I thought that was your busi-
ness." The problem inherent in the reporters' approach is that it
permits a seller to create a product category that cannot be challenged
as defective. The message is that if a particular product configuration
is useful to a particular market, it effectively is immunized.
A late draft at least raises the question of whether the report-
ers ever would be willing to say that the appropriate prevention strat-
egy is to forego the marketing of a product. They say that the re-
quirement of a reasonable alternative design "is based on the common
sense notion that liability should attach only when harm is reason-
ably preventable."213 This way of putting the idea appears to suggest
that not marketing a product is not a "reasonable' method of preven-
tion.
I focus on this cluster of problems not only because they appear
seriously to undermine the alternative design requirement, but be-
cause of their quantitative significance. The cases of asbestos, the
Dalkon Shield, and the alleged hazards of silicone gel breast implants
are symbols of modern injury litigation. All involve products with
allegedly high levels of danger, levels that would at least present a
colorable argument that the hazards of the product are so great that it
211. See generally Marshall S. Shapo, A Nation of Guinea Pigs (Free, 1979).
212. See, for example, Sandra Blakeslee, Dow Corning Had Conflicting Findings on
Silicones, N.Y. Times All (May 9, 1994).
213. Council Draft No. 2 § 2, comment d, at 30 (cited in note 184).
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could properly be said that they outweigh its benefits. Were the
courts to require that plaintiffs show alternative designs in cases like
this-the actual case of asbestos for insulation, the hypothesized case
of an alternative-less Dalkon Shield, and the case of allegedly danger-
ous silicone gel implants, either as hypothesized without an alterna-
tive design or even as a product targeted to a limited popula-
tion-what would be the result?
Products liability law would continue to apply to cases brought
by small pockets of plaintiffs who could, sometimes at great expense,
show alternative designs. But regiments, even whole divisions, of
plaintiffs in asbestos-like cases would find themselves excluded from
the litigation process. Justice Jackson crafted an analogue for this
phenomenon in a great dissenting opinion on governmental immunity,
which incidentally contained a prescient essay on modern products
liability:214 'The King can do only little wrongs.215
I. Intersection of Alternative Design Requirement and
Products That Are Too Dangerous
It is now useful to underline the issues that exist at the inter-
section of the alternative design requirement and the category of
products whose characteristics arguably would make them unreason-
ably dangerous without reference to design alternatives. The princi-
pal problem is that the alternative design requirement permits prod-
uct makers to define their own product categories, in an almost meta-
physical sense.
Having focused principally on real cases, we may indulge here
the enduring torts recreation of the fanciful hypothetical. Assume
that the cheapest "stepladder" currently on the market sells for fif-
teen dollars. I place the word "stepladder" in quotes because the word
is, after all, just a word we use to describe a general concept: a port-
able object, with steps, that conveniently allows persons to climb
gradually to a height above the ground.
Let us further assume that Firm A designs a product that has
all the outward physical characteristics of what is commonly called a
"stepladder." By contrast with even the cheapest "stepladder" cur-
rently marketed, however, Firm A's product has a twenty-five percent
214. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 51 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (saying
"tt]his is a day of synthetic living").
215. Id. at 60.
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chance of collapsing during the first ten uses. The good news is that
Firm A will sell its product for $9.99.
It would seem easy enough for a plaintiff, injured when Firm
A's product collapses, to argue that there is a reasonable alternative
design-a conventional fifteen dollar "stepladder." But suppose that
Firm A insists that its product-which I carefully have avoided calling
a "stepladder" above-is not, in fact, a "stepladder." It calls it an
"economy stepladder," or a "quasi-stepladder," or a "height enhan-
cer."216 If this is a permissible designation, then Firm A has created a
separate product category, and rendered fifteen dollar steplad-
ders--'real stepladders"-a more expensive substitute and not a
"reasonable alternative design."
There are some situations, involving what I have termed
"product continuums,"217 in which the courts properly permit this kind
of solution. I have referred, for example, to the case of a microbus-
type vehicle.218 A recent case that in effect draws on this line of ar-
gument is an Eighth Circuit decision involving a bulletproof vest that
featured certain advantages, but also presented certain safety disad-
vantages relative to other models of vest.219 Reversing a substantial
jury verdict for the plaintiff, the court referred to the "trade-offs" to be
made along the continuum of bullet-proof vests.220
Yet even the product continuum problem presents a good ex-
ample of the kind of situation in which the courts should make the
crucial choice. It is judges, and sometimes juries, who should make
the decision about the risk-utility comparison-as well as the reason-
able consumer expectations-associated with a particular product. A
"Restatement" should not limit that decision to cases in which a
claimant can show a reasonable alternative design.
If there is only "bad asbestos," and no "good asbestos" exists,
the legal rule should not prevent judicial imposition of the defect label
on "bad asbestos," which may be the only kind of asbestos. If the
Dalkon Shield-a "bad product"--were the only kind of intrauterine
contraceptive device, then courts should be able to call it defective
even in the absence of a reasonable alternative design. If the only
IUD were a "bad IUD," the nonexistence of a "good IUD" should not
save "IUDs" from liability.
216. 1 owe the latter phrase to David Robertson.
217. Shapo, 1 The Law of Products Liability 9.09A at 9-28 to 9-30 (cited in note 17)
(passim).
218. See text accompanying note 195.
219. Linegar v. Armour of America, 909 F.2d 1150, 1154-55 (8th Cir. 1990).
220. Id. at 1154.
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The reporters have suggested, in correspondence, that the line
of argument I have presented here invokes "hypothetical horrors"
with no grounding in reality. 21 I respectfully suggest that the reality
is all around us. When courts impose liability on products ranging
from asbestos to particular intrauterine contraceptive devices, they
are making judgments that the qualities of specific nongeneric prod-
ucts render them unreasonably dangerous, and sometimes they are
doing that independently of the informational content of the product
sale. It is axiomatic that consumers trade off dollars against safety
when acquiring the specific packages of benefits and risks we call
products. At some point, courts will insist that the trade-off is too
detrimental, even if the consumer is well apprised of the risks. The
obvious, and perhaps most seminal, case is that of automobile crash-
worthiness.
222
J. Deemed Knowledge, Hindsight, Unknowable Risks
We now examine the issue of whether the law should impose
liability for designs solely on the basis of risks apparent at the time of
trial, without reference to a product maker's knowledge, or even
opportunity for knowledge, at the time of manufacture.
This is an especially vexing problem because the moral and
economic stakes are so high. On the one hand, we must consider the
fact that design cases by definition involve choice, with the implica-
tion that one should not be penalized for risk creation when he had no
opportunity to make a choice about risk. On the other hand, one must
consider that the kind of case in which knowledge of risks accumu-
lates during a period of market experimentation is often just the type
of case that involves large scale harm.
To be sure, history counsels us that the problem may be more
theoretical than practical. Although there has been much criticism of
decisions that purportedly imposed liability for "unknowable risks" on
makers of asbestos products, 2 3 many courts have satisfied themselves
221. Letter from James A. Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski to Marshall S. Shapo
(Sept. 25, 1994) (on file with the Author).
222. A truly generative case is Larsen v. General Motors Corporation, 391 F.2d 495 (8th
Cir. 1968) (imposing a duty of care in automobile design with reference to "second collision"
ijuries).
223. The most discussed case is Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corporation, 90 N.J.
191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982) (disallowing a state-of-the-art defense).
19951 677
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
that these firms engaged in culpable behavior with respect to known
risks.
224
Yet it is necessary to face up to the issue directly, for it impli-
cates the basic concept of strict liability that the law should focus on
the product itself and not on the seller's conduct. The Oregon
Supreme Court has been instrumental in developing this idea: "In a
strict liability case we are talking about the condition (dangerousness)
of an article which is sold without any warning, while in negligence
we are talking about the reasonableness of the manufacturer's actions
in selling the article without a warning.'225 In this intellectual matrix,
one uses the negligence standard to test after the fact whether there
is a defect in a product.26
The academic pedigree of a thoroughgoing strict liability is
itself distinguished. In an often-quoted passage, Dean Keeton de-
clared that "if the sale of a product is made under circumstances that
would subject someone to an unreasonable risk in fact, liability for
harm resulting from those risks should follow."
227
Although the idea of applying a hindsight test to design defect
litigation has elicited severe criticism, the courts have not dealt with
large numbers of cases that frontally present the problem. Yet, if the
question remains largely theoretical, it is worth discussing because it
goes to the heart of the idea of strict liability.
Let us focus the question with a simple hypothetical: What
would a court do with the Case of the Sudden Epidemic? In this situ-
ation, a manufacturer scrupulously observes all industry standards,
and any reasonably applicable ethical principles, in its investigation
and development of a new product, Product X. The firm markets the
product very successfully, and, for fifteen years, without incident. In
the first three months of the sixteenth year of marketing, thousands
of consumers all over the country begin developing a particular kind
of cancer, for which there is strong evidence of a causal association
with Product X. We assume that courts surely would find a company
negligent if it initially had marketed the product possessing the
knowledge of risk that became apparent in the sixteenth year.
224. See, for example, Johnson v. Celotex Corporation, 899 F.2d 1281, 1288 (2d Cir. 1990)
(upholding punitive damages award).
225. Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Company, 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033, 1039 (1974).
226. Allen v. Heil Company, 285 Or. 109, 589 P.2d 1120, 1126-27 (1979) (addressing
whether a "reasonably prudent manufacturer, charged with knowledge" of dangerous condition,
"would in the exercise of reasonable care" sell the product).




What would American courts do with this case, litigated under
the heading of design defect? Defendants would argue that the test
for design defect is nothing more than the negligence test, requiring
at least that the defendant "should have known" of the risk.=
Plaintiffs would say that the very essence of strict liability for prod-
ucts-and of the policy that supports it-requires the imputation of
time-of-trial knowledge to a seller of a product that turns out to be
unreasonably, even monstrously dangerous.
I suggest that the answer to the question of what the courts
would do with this rather pure hypothetical-so far removed, for
example, from the facts of the asbestos litigation as they have devel-
oped-is that we really do not know. Torn between the fairness ar-
guments of defendants opposing liability for a truly unknowable risk
and the justice arguments of plaintiffs grievously injured by a product
whose seller they trusted, the courts would face a momentous choice,
since we have very little in the way of directly relevant case law.229
Perhaps the answer lies in the nature of strict liability as prac-
tically applied. As it has developed in products litigation, the doctrine
may principally provide a vector for decision in close cases. Arguably,
this has been the function of strict liability doctrine in classic
"manufacturing defect" cases; Traynor and Prosser provided a firm
intellectual basis for this employment of the theory.8 0 Arguably, it
has also been the principal function of strict liability in design defect
cases, especially when (as is often the case in real life) it is difficult to
segregate "design" from "manufacturing" defects; the California his-
tory is particularly instructive.31
The tilt of the doctrine, as courts have applied it, has been to
favor "consumer protection"; although that phrase does not appear
often in the American decisions, the European Directive uses it in at
228. Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 593 (1980), provides a leading
synthesis on this point.
229. For a summary of the law weighing against this form of strict liability, see Ellen
Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict Products Liability: The Empire
Strikes Back, 60 U. Chin. L. Rev. 1183 (1992).
230. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring in the judgment); William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale L. J. 1099 (1960).
231. Compare Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d at 9001 (announcing
general principle of strict liability for defective products) with Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corporation, 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162-63 (1972) (setting out a very broad
conceptualization of defect) with Barker v. Lull Engineering Company, Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573
P.2d 443, 446 (1978) (articulating a two-pronged definition of defect, citing Cronin as "refut[ing]"
the distinction between design and manufacturing defects).
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least seven places in its Preamble.23 2 If one had to make a forecast,
one would reasonably predict the use of "strict liability" as a tie-
breaker in the Case of the Sudden Epidemic.
K. Relationship to the UCC
An important aspect of mega-doctrine concerning a products
restatement, counseling the preservation of a maximum degree of
flexibility for state courts, concerns the role of the UCC in products
liability law. A few jurisdictions have continued to adhere to the UCC
as the theory of choice in products cases, although clearly Section
402A tort doctrine hovers around their decisions.33 Quite as impor-
tantly, commercial law notions continue to parallel tort ideas in the
locutions of products law. The idea of the implied warranty of mer-
chantability, in particular, continues to provide nutrients in the for-
mulation of the defect concept,234 and many courts view the warranty
and strict tort doctrines as functional equivalents. 23 5
This Author leans toward the view that tort properly has won
a large part of the field from contract, if not subscribing to the wry
exaggeration of Professor Gilmore.06 However, it would seem that a
products restatement must give full account to the continuing pres-
ence of UCC terminology and concepts-indeed law-in the products
arena. If the warp of products law is tort, there is still some woof of
contract. A recognition of this point seems prudent not only given the
need for judicial flexibility, but also in light of the concurrent progress
of a full scale revision of Article 2 of the UCC.
L. The "Open and Obvious" Hazard
The Draft presents at least two facets of the problem of the
open and obvious risk. Under the heading of a condemnation of
232. Shapo, 26 Cornell Int'l L. J. at 328 (cited in note 106).
233. See, for example, Cline v. Prowler Industries, 418 A.2d 968, 971-80 (Del. 1980); Swartz
v. General Motors Corporation, 375 Mass. 628, 378 N.E.2d 61, 63 (1978) (viewing "strict liability
cases of other jurisdictions" as "a useful supplement to our own warranty case law"). Compare
Garcia v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 456, 462 (Tex. 1980) (holding that the adoption of
Section 402A does not repeal UCC "sections providing redress for personal injury").
234. See, for example, Woodill v. Parke Davis & Company, 58 Ill. App. 3d 349, 374 N.E.2d
683 (1978), affd, 79 111. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980).
235. See, for example, Blueflame Gas, Inc. v. Van Hoose, 679 P.2d 579, 590 (Colo. 1984)
(declaring that burden of proof considerations are "identical" in warranty and strict liability
claims).
236. We are told that Contract, like God, is dead. And so it is." Grant Gilmore, The Death
of Contract 3 (Ohio St. U., 1974).
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"conformance to consumer expectations as a defense," the reporters
declare that "[t]he mere fact that a risk presented by a product design
is open and obvious, and that the product thus satisfies expectations,
does not prevent a finding that the design is defective."' 37 In a sepa-
rate commentary under the warnings category, they say that "[i]n
general, a warning or instruction is not required regarding risks and
risk avoidance measures that should be obvious to foreseeable product
users.)2 38 They reason that since a risk is obvious, and "the prospec-
tive addressee of a warning will or should already know of its exis-
tence," then warnings "in most instances will not provide an effective
additional measure of safety."239
As a general matter, these statements are unexceptionable.
Many courts have opposed the use of "open and obvious" notions as a
defense to design defect cases, especially in the workplace setting.
New York's overruling of its prior law on this point provides perhaps
the most striking illustration.240 And courts surely have invoked an
obviousness defense against "duty to warn" complaints; on this point,
one can cite small libraries of cases.
241
In this connection, I simply wish to underline the fact that
judicial reliance on the idea of "obviousness" uses it as a "surrogate
for intuitions about many things," ranging from "empirical guesses
about comparative availability of information concerning hazards" to
"notions of moral responsibility.' '242 It begins to appear, indeed, that
the obviousness idea shadows a long and diffuse frontier of overlap
among theories of design defect and duty to warn as bases for recov-
ery, misuse as a negation of the cause of action, and misuse, assump-
tion of risk, and contributory negligence as affirmative defenses.4 3
237. Restatement Draft § 2, comment e, at 24 (cited in note 13).
238. Id., comment g, at 26.
239. Id.
240. See Micallefv. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571 (1976), overruling Campo v.
Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
241. See Shapo, 1 The Law of Products Liability 19.11[lia] at 19-88 to 19-100 (cited in
note 17) (passim).
242. Id. I 19.11[1][b] at 19-103.
243. See id. 19.11 at 19-88 to 19-114 (passim).
1995] 681
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:631
VIII. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT RESTATEMENTS
A A Self-Restraint Guideline
The Restatement idea is a special phenomenon. Restatements
are entirely the creature of the ALI, a private organization that de-
pends on members and private donors for its funding. As the product
of a group of lawyers, addressed principally to lawyers, a Restatement
relies entirely on its persuasive power, which depends partly on its
claim to summarize the law as it is and partly on its ability to distill
wisdom on hotly disputed matters. In the latter regard, it will often
be prudent for the Institute to defer to the duly-constituted lawgiver:
the judiciary. For a private organization, prudence counsels a high
degree of self-restraint.
The maiden voyage of the Institute's project for a third torts
Restatement, which focuses on the topic of products liability, would
seem to underline these counsels of prudence. Manifesting the case
for this cautionary advice are the interest of journalists in the subject
and a resultant sense that public arguments on the topic have taken
on the political texture of what is commonly called "spinning."
A brief narrative drawn from experience may be apt. The re-
porters presented Tentative Draft No. 1 to the Institute's meeting in
May 1994. In accordance with the rules of the ALI, I submitted a
proposed amendment for Sections 1 and 2 of the Draft.2 4 During the
244. The unexpurgated text of this admittedly tentative proposal provided that:
(1) One engaged in the business of selling products who sells any product in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to users or those who otherwise encounter
products is liable under any theory of liability applicable to defective products for any
harm to person or property caused by the defect.
(a) "Defective condition" in § 1 includes
(1) A flaw or departure from the intended design of the product even
though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product.
(2) Design features of the product that render it unreasonably unsafe to
persons or property because
(i) The risk of the product outweighs its utility or benefits as
defined by applicable law
(ii) The costs associated with the accident outweigh the costs of
avoiding the accident, as determined by applicable law
(iii) The advertising, promotion and appearance of the product
create an impression of safety that reasonably would be taken to influence decisions to
use or encounter the product
iv) The existence of a feasible alternative design would have
significantly reduced the risk of harm to persons or property.
(2) One who sells a product that is unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer because of inadequate provision of information concerning the hazards of the
product, including inadequate warnings or instructions concerning its hazards, is liable
682
RESTATEMENT PROJECT
brief discussion of this proposal, at the end of a day that featured six
hours of debate on Sections 1 and 2, former director Wechsler sug-
gested that in light of the concerns raised by my proposal and other
comments, it would be appropriate to refer the draft back to the
Reporters for further consideration.
Press reports in at least two publications of the Bureau of
National Affairs-United States Law Week4 5 and the Product Safety
and Liability Reporter246-characterized my amendment as a 'last-
minute proposal.'247 However, the weeks between mid-April, when
the Tentative Draft was circulated, and mid-May, when the ALI met,
represented the very first time that anyone could have responded to
the proposal configured as a tentative draft. These reports also spoke
of the amendment as one that would "largely leave intact the provi-
sions of ... Sec. 402[A], and only tinker at the margins with it."248
The description 'largely leave intact" seems to the author of the
amendment an odd way to describe a proposal approximately ninety
percent of which consists of language that does not appear in Section
402A. The phraseology "only tinker at the margins" seems equally
misdescriptive, given the effort of the amendment to define the con-
ventionally phrased three categories of products liability.
The BNA report referred to unnamed "attorneys" who asserted
that the "proposal... had already been considered and rejected by the
reporters, the Institute's 19 advisers, and the ALI's governing body,
the Council, on many occasions."249 Speaking only with reference to
my understanding of consideration of these matters by the advisers,
my proposal was neither "considered," let alone "rejected," by that
group. Up to the time of the Institute's May 1994 meeting, the advis-
ers had met only once, in June 1993. Finally, a box on the cover of the
Tentative Draft makes clear that, however one characterizes the
for injuries to persons and property when the lack of information about the hazards of
the product is a material factor in causing the injury.
(3) For the purposes of this section, the term "one engaged in the business of
selling products" shall include parties whose economic function in placing products in
commerce is analogous to that of sellers for the purposes of the law relating to liability
for defective products.
(4) In interpreting this section, courts shall take into account the nature of the
transaction by which the product enters commerce and the informational position and
sophistication of the parties.
245. AL! Hesitates on Lawyer Liability, Product Liability Restatement Efforts, 62 U.S.L.W.
2734, 2736 (May 31, 1994).
246. ALT Members Put Off Approval, 22 Product Safety & Liability Rptr. at 522 (cited in
note 128).
247. Id.; ALT Hesitates, 62 U.S.L.W. at 2736 (cited in note 245).




Council, it is the Institute itself that decides whether a draft becomes
a Restatement.
50
The political frame that now surrounds the products project,
symbolized by the press coverage of the Institute's first debate on the
subject, makes especially necessary a working guideline that empha-
sizes restraint in the statement of legal principles. It also raises the
question, discussed below, of to what degree the ALI should strive for
consensus on the disputed issues it considers, and indeed of how one
defines consensus.
B. The Conceptual Framework
It is useful to refer here to the question of whether, in the end,
a third torts Restatement would be a more intact product, intellectu-
ally, if the ALI initially essayed a reappraisal of the conceptual
framework of the Second Restatement. One should note that if a
products restatement were to supplant Section 402A and perhaps
even a few other sections of particular relevance to products law,
more than nine hundred remaining sections of the Second
Restatement still would remain as the position of the Institute.
In light of the choice to go forward with a Third Restatement
on a more discrete subject-focused basis,2 5 1 this issue is rather a moot
one. However, it does shadow any attempt to restate particularized
areas of tort. All lawyers are familiar with the tension between
pragmatic problem solving and building theoretical frameworks. One
is at least entitled to suggest that an emphasis on pragmatism at the
expense of framework may prove befuddling when one confronts spe-
cific problems of application down the road.
C. The Jurisprudence of Restatements
We now confront the need to define the mission of those under-
taking Restatements, who work under the sole auspices of the sole
arbiter of Restatements-the American Law Institute. It is clear that
in the most interesting cases, it will be difficult to provide a blacklet-
ter answer. Counting the cases, even creatively, or proposing the
250. "As of the date of publication, this Draft has not been considered by the members of
the American Law Institute and does not represent the position of the Institute on any of the
issues with which it deals." Restatement Draft, cover page, box (cited in note 13) (repeated,
inside cover page).
251. See text accompanying note 118.
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Institute's version of wisdom? "Restatement" or wish list? How far
does the Institute's educational mission extend?
Here the question of consensus enters the picture. Because the
ALI is a voting body, there is something inherently political about its
processes. But the traditions of the body, including the notion that
"you check your clients at the door," imply a higher ideal. Perhaps at
their most idealistic, these traditions suggest Henry Hart's version of
how an ideal Supreme Court would deliberate, its members striving
in untrammeled sessions of free and open discussion to convince one
another of the right answer.252
Perhaps a more practical way to put the question is, what is
the meaning of consensus in the context of a Restatement? If the
matter is simply one of voting on political preferences, one may re-
solve the question easily: count the votes. If it requires convincing
specialists that a certain position most rationally aligns with practice
and policy, a proper resolution of a disputed issue would take much
more time, perhaps forever as human affairs are measured. A more
pragmatic model would require that even if critics do not find them-
selves persuaded, arguments must be presented that all are at least
willing to say have persuasive power, even if they are not personally
convincing.
D. The Restatement and the Courts
This leads us to the question of what attitude the Restatement
should take to heavily disputed issues that are the subject not only of
great controversy but of ongoing development in judicial thought.
One such issue is whether the risk-utility test or the consumer expec-
tations test, or a combination of these, should govern the judgment of
defect questions. Another arises from the Draft's requirement that
plaintiffs show a reasonable alternative design.
In a situation where the law still appears to be in a process of
dispute and development on these issues, it is appropriate to ask
whether the Institute should use as its default rule an answer that it
has given on a number of issues, including some issues covered in the
Tentative Draft: leave the question to the developing case law. 53 To
252. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreworik The Time Chart of
the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, for example, at 124-25 (1959).
253. See, for example, Restatement Draft § 2, comment 1, at 34 (cited in note 13)
(discussing the burden of proof on misuse, modification, and alteration). Compare, for example,
Restatement (Second) § 402A, comment o (saying that "It]he Institute expresses neither
approval nor disapproval of expansion of the rule" to cover nonusers and nonconsumers) with
UCO § 2-318, comment 3 (1966), reprinted in 1A Uniform Laws Annotated 558 (West, 1989)
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put the point more baldly, the ALI should not undertake to make law
for judges.
The guideline here simply is that on matters where the law is
truly in the process of development, a Restatement should maximize
opportunities for courts to identify and resolve unsettled issues for
themselves. As we have already indicated,2 this principle of self-
restraint applies doubly when political overtones provide a substan-
tial amount of background noise. Giving wry point to this observation
is the remark of a colleague who expressed dubiety about the under-
taking of a products restatement because of the political context of the
subject. The constitutional analogue, he said, would be that "next, the
ALI will undertake a Restatement of Abortion."
The history of products liability law has provided an especially
dramatic example of the advantages of this approach. That history
has featured an ongoing process of judicial conversation among state
and federal courts. Slowly, and sometimes painfully, they have cre-
ated a body of law through confrontation with concrete cases. Where
they have not reached consensus, it is imprudent to try to force the
dialogue beyond what the cases clearly reveal.
A quarter century ago, in the years of the first blossoming of
Section 402A, Herbert Wechsler declared that "What [the
Restatements] have been and are in fact" is "a modest but essential
aid in the improved analysis, clarification, unification, growth and
adaptation of the common law."ms This description fits many, perhaps
most, of the sections of the Draft. However, the Draft is at odds with
this model in a few very important choices of policy and language,
choices that either depart from the current of the law or sound un-
avoidably political overtones on issues on which courts are striving to
find a relatively dispassionate legal solution. I have earlier identified
and commented on these choices.2 7 They include, for example, the
Draft's cast-iron insistence on the general requirement of a reason-
able alternative design. They also include its exclusive reliance on a
risk-utility test, set in a void of nonrecognition of the importance of
product promotion to the decision of consumers to use or encounter
products.
(saying that the section "is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case
law" on the scope of warranties).
254. See text accompanying notes 244-50.
255. The insight is that of Tom Merrill.
256. Herbert Wechsler, Restatements and Legal Change: Problems of Policy in the
Restatement Work of the American Law Institute, 13 S.L.U. L. J. 185, 192 (1968).
257. See Part VII.
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I should emphasize that my critique of these provisions does
not imply criticism of the reporters' enormous efforts to provide codifi-
cation and clarification concerning the many other issues covered in
other parts of their drafts. Unfortunately, these few choices in the
Draft come at checkpoints in the law that are so crucial that they
represent a bid to revamp the law of products liability as it is in fact,
both in judicial decisions and in practice.
The very recent history of the new products project, in which
this writer has been a "participant-observer," gives point to the need
to strive for consensus, and to be cautious about pushing beyond it.
Among other things, with journalists somehow becoming inspired to
speak of motions firmly anchored in Institute processes as 'monkey
wrenches," a consensus-oriented approach would promote civility
and mutual respect within an important deliberative body.
E. The Grayletter Law of Torts
An important substantive premise for the abstemious argu-
ment I develop here is that torts is principally grayletter law.59
Lawyers all understand the continuing tension in each branch of the
law between supple factor analysis and relatively chiseled rules. I
simply stress that, perhaps more than in most branches of law, torts
demands an emphasis on facts and a suppleness of rules: that, in-
deed, flexibility is the hallmark of not only how courts act in tort
cases, but of how they must act.260
By parity, I suggest that interpretative judgments about case
law in torts are, on average, more controvertible than the judgments
typically made in other areas covered by Restatements. This is so
with respect to the most simple sounding rules on intentional torts.261
It is surely so in the area where duty and proximate cause exist in
uneasy dissonance.22 And it is emphatically so when one deals with
the law of products liability, in particular with such questions as the
258. This was one reporter's unattributed description to me of the motion I described at
text accompanying note 244.
259. I am indebted to Richard Merrill for his conversational use of the phrase, in another
legal context.
260. Illustrative of the continuing tensions between rule and fact-oriented foci are the
California cases on liability of negligent parties to bystander witnesses. See, for example, Thing
v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 817-30 (1989) (summarizing precedents).
261. See, for example, Restatement (Second) § 8A (defining "intent").




hegemony of the risk-utility standard or the consumer expectations
test.
I suggest, simply, that in this milieu, one ventures at his peril
the more one pushes into the forest of the blackletter rule in torts.
IX. SPECIFIC CONCERNS ABOUT THE PRODUCTS RESTATEMENT
A. A Change in Practice?
Perhaps the most vexing aspect of the Draft lies in its potential
to change the face of products liability law. The assertion that it
would do so is itself controversial, for supporters of the Draft argue
that the complaint itself represents a form of "spinning." At this
point, one can only be reportorial, and note that a number of distin-
guished attorneys-on the record, so far, plaintiffs' attorneys-argue
that the Draft significantly changes their ability to present com-
plaints and evidence on behalf of plaintiffs who wish to sue for design
defects. If one seeks to dismiss this perception as inhering only in the
eyes of beholders, one must confront the fact that beholders some-
times may provide accurate expert testimony about present reality. If
the assertion is true, then it would call into question the claim of the
Draft to be a Restatement of the Law, at least as the law is practiced.
B. The Rationales for Section 402A
A related set of questions concerns the rationales for Section
402A. The reporters have made clear that they reject the consumer
contemplation idea embraced by comment g to the Second
Restatement, at least as a principal pillar for design defect judg-
ments.2 3 We already have indicated that this seems an unfortunate
retrogression in a day when mass media promotion becomes ever
more subtle.
The other comments to Section 402A, in language sometimes
almost orotund, set out a broad rationale of consumer protection. The
drafters spoke in comment c of the product seller as having
"undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any member
of the consuming public who may be injured" by a product, and of a
public that is "forced to rely upon the seller" and has the "right to and
263. Compare id. § 402A, comment g, with Restatement Draft § 2, comment e, at 23-24
(cited in note 13).
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does expect... that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods."26
They declared that "public policy demands that the burden of acciden-
tal injuries... be placed upon those who market" defective products,
and that the consumer is "entitled to the maximum of protection at
the hands of someone," namely, the seller.25 The Draft does not make
clear whether it considers these rationales to be unsophisticated, or
plain wrong, either singly or collectively.
An important rationale that tends to be implicit in the com-
ments, but which the courts have explicitly loaded onto Section 402A,
is that of affecting seller conduct. This raises the question of what
effects the body of law developed under Section 402A has had on
product safety. It is difficult to secure precise behavioral evidence on
this point, but it seems rather clear that development of the law since
1960 has significantly affected the decision making of manufacturers
concerning design risks. A Rand Corporation report makes this clear
in a single sentence, abstract but powerful: "Be careful, or you will be
sued."2 66 Many documents emanating from the manufacturing com-
munity speak of the disincentives to innovation that product makers
perceive because of their reading of products liability law.267
Whether the law has purchased too much safety at the cost of
product advances-which themselves might have positive health and
safety properties-is a difficult empirical question. One is entitled to
ask whether the ALI possesses the information to take a position on
that question. One also must ask whether the reporters are able to
identify, with any degree of precision, the dysfunctional effects on
behavior caused by the law developed under Section 402A.
Another idea supporting the development of Section 402A
inheres in the supposition that the traditional negligence rules of
proof create hurdles that are too high for many plaintiffs with merito-
rious cases. The Draft accepts this point concerning manufacturing
defect cases.26 8 With its requirement that plaintiffs show a reasonable
alternative design, it implicitly rejects it in design cases. This repre-
sents a change in the underlying current of the law.
In general, the Draft at least implicitly raises the question of
whether Section 402A is too generous in its commitment to consumer
264. Restatement Second § 402A, comment c.
265. Id.
266. George Eads and Peter Reuter, Designing Safer Products: Corporate Responses to
Product Liability Law and Regulation viii (Rand, 1983).
267. See, for example, Committee for Economic Development, Whw Should Be Liable? 89
(Commitee for Economic Development, 1989) (noting that some products are never marketed
because of fear of prohibitive liability).
268. See Restatement Draft § 2, comment a, at 10 (cited in note 13).
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protection. It seems to imply that this is so, and that consumers are
better able to take care of themselves than the Institute believed
when it adopted Section 402A. It would be helpful to make that sup-
position explicit, if it exists, or in any event to speak to the issue.
C. Comparing the Development of Section 402A
and the New Tentative Draft
Tentative Draft No. 6 to Section 402A,26 9 dated April 7, 1961,
bore the title "Liability of Persons Supplying Chattels for the Use of
Others," and announced a strict liability principle for "one engaged in
the business of selling food for human consumption who sells such
food in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the con-
sumer."270 This formulation represented a single penetrating insight,
contained in Prosser's noteworthy article, "The Assault on the
Citadel," published in the Yale Law Journal in 1960.271 A caveat said
that "[tihe Institute expresses no opinion as to," inter alia, whether
this rule applied "to articles other than food.
1272
A preliminary "Note to Institute" in Tentative Draft No. 7,273
dated April 16, 1962, referred to "the interest and discussion which
the Section has aroused."2 74 It added to food, as the sole subject of the
strict liability principle, "other products for intimate bodily use," a
category for which it gave as examples clothing, soap, and cosmet-
ics. 275
These apparently were the only tentative drafts that dealt
with products liability. The Institute approved a final draft, which
applied the strict liability principle to "all products," in May of 1964,
for inclusion in the Restatement. Prosser, the reporter, said at the
time that if the section were published that summer, "it will be on the
edge of becoming dated before it is published."276 He referred to the
developing case law since 1962, extending beyond "products for inti-
mate bodily use," as "the speediest development in the law of torts" in
his lifetime, "as well as being one of the most spectacular."277
269. Restatement (Second) of the Law, Torts: Tentative Draft No. 6 § 402A at 24 (1961)
("Tent. Draft No. 6").
270. Id.
271. Prosser, 69 Yale L. J. 1099 (cited in note 18).
272. Tent. Draft No. 6 at 24 (caveat) (cited in note 269).
273. Restatement (Second) of the Law, Torts: Tentative Draft No. 7 § 402A at 1 (1962).
274. Id. at 1.
275. Id. at 3, comment d.




The signs of hurry implicit in this language should carry a
lesson for the present Restatement project. The lesson should be
especially apparent in light of the fact that the development of this
single section, Section 402A, progressed through three full Institute
discussions, spanning a period of four years. Against this back-
ground, it rings oddly to lament that the reporters, "busily drafting
the next several sections," "might not have the surplus energy to
revisit the earlier issues."'278
D. Subtle Effects on Design Defect Law
If it is correct that a principal function of strict liability is to
provide a tie-breaking principle for close cases, 79 then an important
effect of an explicit departure from strict liability for design defect
cases will be to introduce an extra weight in the scale against design
complaints. Because of the complexity of the technology, and the
intricacy of the issues, such cases tend to begin with a strong pre-
sumption in favor of the manufacturer. The elimination of the theory
as a recognized ground for complaint will have an effect at the most
important margin-that of judicial decision--concerning the merit of
design cases. Whether that effect would prove ultimately desirable
from a social point of view is a question for which it is difficult to fimd
a quantitative answer.
X. DERIVINGA SOLUTION
I suggest here several principles that might well guide the
development of a products restatement for the next century.
A. Evolution from Section 402A
Whatever the form adopted by the new Restatement, it would
seem prudent to preserve at least the relevant foundations of Section
402A. This strategy entails a respect for judicial history and the
choices of more than forty courts in hundreds and thousands of deci-
sions. It conveys a sense of evolution rather than that of a sudden,
dramatic change for which little supporting evidence is apparent.
278. ALI Members Put Off Approval, 22 Product Safety & Liability Rptr. at 522 (cited in
note 128) (characterizing views of "most attendees interviewed" at 1994 meeting of ALI).
279. See text preceding note 230.
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This approach seems especially important with respect to
Section 402A. The Institute proudly proclaims that the Restatements
have garnered 125,000 citations from the courts, of which 51,000 have
been to the Torts Restatements.2 0 Several thousand of these citations
have been to Section 402A. I am told that the ALI executive office
estimates that there are 3,200 cases decided under the section. I
speculate that this number is rather low, since the CCH Products
Liability Reporter alone has published approximately eight thousand
decisions since 1967. In any event, the number is a substantial one.
Certainly, most of the courts that have handed down these decisions
have adopted Section 402A-some in the first wave of enthusiastic
response2 1 and others after lengthy consideration. 282 They also have
made abundant reference to many of the comments to Section 402A
that receive short shrift in the Draft.
The Draft presents a new conceptual framework, with a com-
pletely new set of headings. Every lawyer knows that there is no
magic in a name. But when the name represents a concept, and now
signifies three decades of historical development, even an unsenti-
mental observer would suggest that it would be the better part of
common sense to establish a historical link to the named idea that
the courts have adopted.
In this connection, a word is in order about the functional
analysis the reporters have avowedly adopted. 283 At least two decades
ago, I indicated my own sympathies with the idea of dedoctrinalizing
the law of products liability.2 Any scholar, trying to understand the
roots of the law, must attempt to cut below the surface of doctrine.
Yet there is a practical side to doctrine we should not ignore: its abil-
ity to provide a convenient verbal, as well as conceptual, packaging of
ideas that facilitates legal discourse.
It is thus proper to ask how courts, with investments of twenty
to thirty years in a doctrine fostered and sanctified by the ALI itself,
will react to the news that the existing structure is slated for demoli-
tion. One suspects that judges will move only slowly from the grooves
worn by the existing terminology. The more functional news is that
products cases will tend to proceed in the grooves of reality dictated
280. See ALI, 71st Annual Meeting, Annual Reports 19 (May 1994).
281. See, for example, Suvada v. White Motor Company, 32 Il. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182,
187-89 (1965) (summarizing arguments in favor of strict liability that "coincide with the position
taken in section 402A).
282. See, for example, Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 341-45 (Wyo. 1986).
283. See, for example, Restatement Draft § 2, comment j, at 30 (cited in note 13).
284. See Shapo, 60 Va. L. Rev. at 1369 (cited in note 165) (proposing "consumer tort" label).
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by social thought and economic conditions, insofar as one differenti-
ates reality from language.
One cannot forecast with certainty how courts would take to a
new set of legal formulas for products liability. There is an ironic
precursor, however. In the penultimate paragraph of his article
Palsgraf Revisited in the Michigan Law Review in 1952, Prosser ex-
tols Leon Green-indeed suggesting that torts scholars owed Green
"obeisance"--for his development of duty analysis in Palsgraf-type
cases.25 But in the last paragraph, Prosser takes away what obei-
sance gave: he says that since the terminology of proximate cause has
proved so attractive to courts and scholars, people might as well stick
with it.2
There is a double irony in this. The first irony is in Prosser's
turnabout within two paragraphs-an obeisance to function and an
embrace of form. The second irony-for me, as a student and col-
league of Green's-is that I should suggest that form may sometimes
provide a convenient housing for reality. A Colorado decision cap-
tures the point with its reference to "the very social policies upon
which section 402A is based.' 2 7 My suggestion is deferential, but an
intense judicial history of thirty years, involving thousands of cases,
indicates that the framework-indeed the existence-of Section 402A
provides an important reality for the drafters of a products restate-
ment.
In summary, one must emphasize the need to give full recogni-
tion to the trade-off between function and familiarity, and to under-
stand that sometimes reality and familiarity achieve a kind of practi-
cal fusion. One must also stress that Section 402A is, and was, the
ALI's product, adopted as the creature of the courts.28
B. Room for Judging
A second principle for restatement in this area is one that
recognizes that courts are society's principal agents for lawmaking in
private disputes-in short, for judging. This principle draws both on
the value of courts as sifting agents and learned disputants on close
questions, and on the highly fact-specific nature of products cases. It
285. William L. Prosser, PalsgrafRevisited, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 32 (1953).
286. Id.
287. McHargue v. Stokes Division of Pennwalt, 686 F. Supp. 1428, 1436 (D. Colo. 1988).
288. In this regard, one may distinguish such ALI creations as the Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers, and the project on Corporate Governance, which have written on a cleaner
slate than the one that faces the products restatement.
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urges that courts be allowed to do their grayletter job, applying their
own carefully developed principles of products liability law to particu-
lar fact situations.
I select just two examples to demonstrate the way that it may
take prolonged consideration of a single case to adduce the correct
principles-even the correct opposition of principles-applicable to a
specific situation. One of these litigations produced a reported deci-
sion in the Michigan court of appeals, 9 then drew two full sets of
reported opinions in the Michigan Supreme Court.290 In this tragic
case, in which a quadriplegic plaintiff ascribed his injuries to alleged
design defects in an above-ground swimming pool, the supreme court
remained bitterly divided at the end of its full rehearing, which like
the first decision held for the defendant. But it is noteworthy that one
writer of a dissenting opinion on first hearing changed his mind on
rehearing and wrote the majority opinion.291 Perhaps most satisfying
from a standpoint of development of the law, though admittedly not
litigation costs for the parties, was the development of ever more
specific arguments on both sides of the case.292 Disagreements be-
tween the two wings of the court on the characterization of the case293
reflect the difficulties inherent in overlapping notions of defect, duty
to warn and "obviousness."
289. Glittenburg v. Wilcenski, 174 Mich. App. 321,435 N.W.2d 480,483 (1989).
290. Glittenberg v. Doughboy Recreational Industries, Inc., 436 Mich. 673, 462 N.W.2d 348,
366 (1990), on rehearing 441 Mich. 379, 491 N.W.2d 208 (1992).
291. See Glittenberg, 462 N.W.2d at 360 (Boyle, J., dissenting); 491 N.W.2d at 210 (Boyle,
J., majority opinion).
292. See generally the opinions on rehearing, 491 N.W.2d at 210-19.
293. Compare, for example, Glittenberg, 462 N.W.2d at 356 (majority's disquisition on
Michigan precedent as "merely relegat[ing] the 'open and obvious danger' rule" to cases involv-
ing "simple" products) with id. at 362 (Archer, J., dissenting) (saying that the obviousness of a
risk is "only one factor to be considered in deciding whether a manufacturer has a duty to warn
of product dangers and, therefore, cannot be the sole basis upon which a defective design case
can be dismissed"). Compare also 491 N.W.2d at 216 (saying that "where the very condition
that is alleged to cause the injury is wholly revealed by casual observation of a simple product in
normal use, a duty to warn serves no fault-based purpose) with id. at 226 (Levin, J., dissent-
ing) (insisting that "Itihe simplicity or complexity of a product is not controlling" and that "[t~he
pertinent inquiry is whether a danger is latent," and commenting that "[ilf a simple product can
never in principle present an obvious risk to users, then the definition of 'simple product' merely
expresses the prejudgment that no latent risk inheres").
The reporters have commented to me that Glittenberg represents "straightforward
struggling with a difficult law-fact problem," that "[t]he law is not the problem" because
"[a]lmost all courts adhere to the legal proposition that useless warnings need not be given" and
that the question of at what point warnings become useless "is, and will remain, a difficult law-
fact question." Letter of James A. Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski to Marshall S. Shapo
(Sept. 25, 1994). The history of the litigation, I suggest, indicates that the law is sufficiently
complicated that the text paragraph represents a reasonable description of relevant reality.
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I mention the second case, Todd v. Societe Bic, S.A.,294 in part
because of its symbolism to the ALI's consideration of products liabil-
ity. The Seventh Circuit's resolution of this case was published just a
few days before the Institute's first discussion of the Tentative Draft.
Tellingly, despite the Draft's insistence on a risk-utility test as the
sole basic formula for design defects, the federal court's opinion exhib-
its a pervasive sense of the complexity of Illinois law concerning the
appropriate defect test. Though recognizing that "the Illinois
Supreme Court has authorized use of the [risk-utility] test in some
cases, 295 the court assumed "that the Illinois Supreme Court would
not apply the risk-utility test to a simple but obviously dangerous
product." It concluded that it was appropriate for the district court to
decide that the lighter in question was "obviously dangerous, but not
unreasonably dangerous, without reference to the risk-utility test."296
Judge Ripple complained, in dissent, of the employment of judicial
resources on a panel decision, a full en banc hearing, an attempt at
certification, and, finally, a second en banc consideration.29
7
Although sympathizing with Judge Ripple's lament-and at
the same time generally favoring a consumer expectations test, at
least as a full alternative to a risk-utility standard-I offer Todd as
an example of the need for judicial running room rather than for the
substance of its decision on the law. The long process that Judge
Ripple so critically described is just one manifestation of the impor-
tance of allowing courts to work through disputed issues in this highly
controversial area of the law.
C. Preserving Strict Liability
A third principle is that a products restatement should pre-
serve the concept of strict liability. I state this point separately from
the proposition that a new products restatement should preserve at
least the framework of Section 402A. Although I have expressed my
own support for the idea of dedoctrinalizing the law, I believe that
both because of the tiebreaking nature of the doctrine and the famili-
arity of courts with the concept, it would be wise to preserve it in the
Restatement itself. The reporters have in fact expressed a limited
tolerance for strict liability, among other theories, within their newly
294. Todd v. Societe Bic, S.A, 21 F.3d 1402 (7th Cir. 1994).
295. Id. at 1411-12.
296. Id. at 1412.
297. See id. at 1415 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
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constructed functional mansion.28 However, one may seriously ques-
tion whether that edifice would at all allow a court to apply the no-
tions of strict liability that many courts apply in many design cases.
A generation of precedent indicates that judicial adoption of
Section 402A encompassed a commitment to a higher level of con-
sumer protection than did the prior law. A return to the standards
prevailing before Section 402A presumably would entail a return to
the level of consumer protection that existed then. One may reason-
ably question whether at this date, a Restatement should be making
that choice. Yet the vector of the most crucial provisions of the Draft
would appear to move in that direction.
D. A Flexible Standard for Design Defects
A products restatement should set broad, flexible standards for
design defects that accord with actual judicial performance. Most
American courts draw on a varied menu of factors in deciding whether
a design defect case is meritorious. A Restatement should preserve
the flexibility that will enable courts to continue dealing with these
difficult problems, creating specific principles interstitially as they
prove workable.
E. Warnings
The warnings principles of a products restatement should
focus on adequacy of information, eschewing terminology that com-
mingles the idea of duties and adequacy of warning with the concept
of defect, and they should also focus on effectiveness of communica-
tion.
In this regard, one should emphasize that although the tradi-
tional triptych of manufacturing defects/design defects/failure to warn
is convenient for discussion, a Restatement should avoid oversharpen-
ing the distinctions between those categories. There is considerable
fuzziness along the boundary between design defects and manufactur-
ing defects, 99 as there is on the frontier between design defects and
failure to warn.30
298. Restatement Draft § 2, commentj, at 30 (cited in note 13).
299. See, for example, Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corporation, 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153,
1155-56 (1972).
300. The full-blown development of the asbestos litigation has made this clear.
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F. Focus on Information and Sophistication
A products restatement should declare, in blackletter when
possible, the importance of the factors of information and sophistica-
tion relative to both sellers and consumers. This is important because
these factors, which prove crucial in so many products cases, provide
a meeting ground for considerations of both morality and efficiency.
Analysts who fancy themselves tough minded economic savants may
choose to fix solely on considerations of efficiency, but the ability to
command and understand bodies of information has overtones of
power of the sort that often influence courts.
G. Product Promotion
A products restatement should recognize, explicitly and em-
phatically, the central role of product promotion in creating impres-
sions of safety that reasonably would be taken to influence decisions
to use or encounter the product.
H. Functional Analysis of Distributional Roles
The courts have wrestled in hundreds of cases with the issue of
whether defendants' distributional roles justify the imposition of
liability.30' This set of questions requires functional analysis, which
conveniently may be focused on the question of whether a party's
economic role is analogous to that of sellers for the purposes of impos-
ing products liability.
XI. CONCLUSION: A MODERN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Like the law that has been developed by American courts, and
the new law of the European Community, a products restatement
should respond to the complexity of products technology, and to the
subtlety of appeals used in product advertising. It should, moreover,
preserve the flexibility of judging and the creativity accompanying it
that have been the hallmarks of the judicial development of American
products liability law.




As this Article goes to press, the House of Representatives is in
the process of considering legislative proposals that would nationalize
some features of products liability law. Certain features of these bills,
as reported, would change parts of the general American law of prod-
ucts liability, rendering moot some issues in the debate over the pro-
posed products Restatement. They also would render this Article
more a historical commentary than a policy critique, at least with
respect to its application to the substance of the proposed
Restatement.
I would note, however, that in addition to its historical analy-
sis and its critique of the Restatement process, the Article still would
represent a policy commentary on any legislation that affected sub-
stantive products liability standards. Indeed, should any such pro-
posals become law, the approach of this Article might help to provide
an intellectual foundation for what surely will be the first wave of
legislative amendments on the next turn of the political tide. In the
uncertainty of the moment, this Author would remark only that poli-
ticization of the common law of torts is risky business, whether done
by Congress or the American Law Institute.
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